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ABSTRACT
For over a decade, the Mexican government has invested itself
in a “frontal attack” on drug trafficking organizations with
catastrophic results. Little to nothing has been gained in limiting
drug production, use, or trafficking, while violence has skyrocketed
and major institutional and human rights crises have evolved.
Through a multidisciplinary approach—which includes history,
sociology, policy analysis, and constitutional doctrine—this essay
evaluates drug prohibition in Mexico: its history, key components
and documented results. It concludes that prohibition, as a guiding
principle of drug policy, can and should be abandoned for all drugs,
for both practical and normative reasons. It proposes a set of
guiding principles that should orient the legalization of all drugs
and then fleshes out concrete regulatory proposals for specific drug
markets, pondering their relative benefits and risks. Although
anchored in a specific case study, the essay should be considered a
broader contribution to enrich discussions as drug policy reform
moves from state to national jurisdictions and from marijuana to
other drugs.
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INTRODUCTION

We start by fully agreeing with a chief conclusion of the 2011
Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy: “The global war
on drugs has failed, with devastating consequences for individuals
and societies around the world.”1 We adhere to the Commission’s
observation that the international drug control regime, by being
based essentially on a punitive law enforcement paradigm, has
resulted in more violence, larger prison populations, and the erosion
of governance around the world.2 Additionally, the health concerns
associated with drug use have been negatively affected by the drug
control regime’s efforts.3
Globally, prohibition has proven to be a poor framework for the
protection of health, risk management and harm reduction.
Moreover, when strongly enforced, prohibition has devastating
effects on institutional capacity and legitimacy, economic
development, social peace, and public health, as measured in terms
of the most basic indicators.4 The prevailing drug policy, including
reduction of drug use, availability of illicit drugs or the efficiency of
institutional resources, has been ineffective and, in fact,
counterproductive. As stated in the 2014 Global Commission on
Drug Policy’s Report: “After more than half a century of this
punitive approach, there is now overwhelming evidence that
[prohibition] has not only failed to achieve its own objectives but has
also generated serious social and health problems.”5

1
Global Commission on Drug Policy, The War on Drugs 2 (June 2011),
https://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/GCDP_WaronDrugs_EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/87HL-5GAC].
2 Id. at 2–3.
3 See id. at 2 (“[r]epressive efforts directed at consumers impede public health
measures to reduce HIV/AIDS, overdose fatalities, and other harmful
consequences of drug use.”).
4 See OLIVER MEZA & EDGAR GUERRA, POLÍTICA DE DROGAS EN LAS AMÉRICAS:
REDEFINIENDO EL PROBLEMA Y EL PAPEL DEL ESTADO [DRUG POLICY IN THE AMERICAS:
REDEFINING THE PROBLEM AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE] 1, 26 (2017),
http://www.politicadedrogas.org/PPD/documentos/20171204_124423_pol%C3
%ADtica_de_drogas_en_las_américas_v0.10_isbn.pdf [https://perma.cc/WPY3MVAG] (affirming that the current state drug enforcement scheme harms its
citizens by reducing public health, delegitimizing the state, and creating avoidable
social and economic costs).
5
Global Commission on Drug Policy, Taking Control: Pathways to Drug Policies
That Work 11 (Sept. 2014), https://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/wp-
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The irony is that this failure, happening in Mexico and globally,
should not be surprising at all, considering that the policy is wholly
inconsistent with best knowledge from life sciences, sound public
health research, and basic economic analysis. Essential insights
from life sciences indicate that even if the best possible prevention
strategies were applied—which unfortunately has never been the
case—there would still be a residual demand for drugs, irrespective
of whether they are prohibited or even highly priced in whichever
market they are available.
For its part, economic analysis
demonstrates that prohibiting the production and consumption of
any merchandise for which demand exists invariably leads to the
creation of a black market by individuals and organizations willing
Significantly, it also indicates that
to violate the law.6
decriminalizing the use and production of a prohibited drug and
taxing its consumption would cause a greater reduction in its output
than the enforcement of its prohibition (even if enforcement were
aimed at an optimal level, in practice, most likely unachievable).7
Drugs have been a part of human culture throughout history.
Prohibition has been the exception, not the rule, in deciding what to
do about drugs. Prohibition is an experiment that has failed
brutally.8 Mexico is one of the most dramatic examples of this failure
and its costly consequences. It is both a transit country and a
producer of illicit substances destined primarily for the United
States. The size of Mexico’s illegal drug activities makes it a fertile
ground for criminal organizations to profit and obtain abundant
resources that can be used to corrupt authorities and institutions.
Despite harsh drug laws and intensive enforcement of these laws,
the use of drugs in Mexico has increased over the past decade.
Additionally, legal institutions and constitutional protections have
content/uploads/2016/03/GCDP_2014_taking-control_EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W7RL-K8AD].
6 See, e.g., Ernesto Zedillo, Drug Policy: A Shameful Failure of Modern Civilization,
in ENDING THE WAR ON DRUGS, 23–38 (Richard Branson ed., 2016) (observing the
connections between drug prohibition policies and the rise of black markets and
violent crime in the Americas).
7
See Gary S. Becker, Kevin Murphy, & Michael Grossman, The Economic
Theory of Illegal Goods: The Case on Drugs 18–19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 10976, 2004), https://www.nber.org/papers/w10976.pdf
[https://perma.cc/54EK-36T7].
8
See, e.g., Oriol Romaní, Una antropología de las drogas [An anthropology of
drugs], LA JORNADA (July 2, 2015), https://www.jornada.com.mx/2015/07/02/lsopinion.html [https://perma.cc/83KY-NTZP] (noting that the main flaw in the
experiment of prohibition is that it assumed the ability to solve complex social
problems with scientific or bureaucratic management).
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been weakened, scarce resources have been misspent and violence
has been fueled. And yet, Mexico’s drug laws—premised on
prohibition—have remained practically unchanged.
More
strikingly, their enforcement has been increasingly enhanced.
Today, Mexico criminally persecutes and incarcerates people who
use drugs, women with no prior convictions who transport drugs
from one place to another, and small-scale drug dealers (who are
easily replaced by other young men or women when detained).9
Mexico also uses military forces to intercept drug trafficking and to
eradicate illicit crops, using dangerous pesticides that pollute the
water and contaminate the land in poor rural areas.10
The policy conclusions stemming from the above insights, for
which the Global Commission has advocated and which we fully
endorse, are very concrete: if drug policy puts public health,
community safety, human rights and development at its center, the
last thing that governments should be doing is inducing black
markets where criminal organizations thrive.11 Consequently,
States should stop criminalizing people for drug use and possession.
It would be inconsistent to decriminalize demand without taking
supply out of the hands of criminal organizations. Other aspects
being equal, demand liberalization could boost the illegal
traffickers’ revenues and thus their criminal power. Hence, the
Commission’s other key recommendation is for States to get the
supply of drugs under control through responsible legal
regulation.12
We subscribe to those recommendations mindful that for over a
century, prohibition—and its intended enforcement—has prevailed
as the preferred policy approach for dealing with the use of drugs,
but also encouraged by changes that have been taking place lately.
In 2013, Uruguay became the first country to pass a law fully
regulating cannabis, which took effect in 2017.13 Canada followed

9 See Catalina Pérez Correa & Andrés Ruiz, A ras de tierra: Marihuana y
Pesticidas [At ground level: Marijuana and Pesticides], NEXOS (July 2018),
https://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=38377 [https://perma.cc/TTM3-EVVK].
10 See id. at 9 (asserting that paraquat, the pesticide often used by the state to
destroy marijuana crops, often causes severe health problems such as intestinal
bleeding, liver damage, skin problems, and an increased risk of Parkinson’s when
ingested due to water and crop contamination).
11 Taking Control: Pathways to Drug Policies That Work, supra note 5.
12 Taking Control: Pathways to Drug Policies That Work, supra note 5, at 23–31.
13
Global Commission on Drug Policy, Regulation: The Responsible Control of
Drugs
10
(2018),
https://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/wp-
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in 2017.14 By November 2018, 28 states within the United States had
regulated cannabis for medical purposes and eight of those had
regulated cannabis for recreational purposes.15 In January 2018,
Vermont became the first state to legalize cannabis for adult use
through the legislative process.16 Several Latin-American countries
have also regulated cannabis for medical purposes.17 Of course,
earlier successful experiences with policies giving more importance
to public health than to punitive actions, like those in Portugal,
Switzerland and Australia, are also supportive of the approaches
suggested below for Mexico’s case.18
The first part of this document briefly explains the origins of
Mexican prohibition early in the 20th century and describes some of
the existing drug policies and laws. The second part reviews some
of the most salient negative consequences of current policies, both
for people who use drugs and for the broader population in terms
of public health and public security. It shows that prohibition,
undoubtedly, has had serious costs on the institutional capacity to
prevent and punish criminality. The third section proposes basic
principles that should orient drug policy in Mexico and
recommendations for its reform. Finally, based on those principles,
we offer concrete proposals for the decriminalization and regulation
of drug markets in the country.
As the Global Commission on Drug Policy affirms in its 2018
report, Regulation: The Responsible Control of Drugs, there is no “one
size fits all” regulation model.19 Rather, “regulation models adopted
content/uploads/2018/09/ENG-2018_Regulation_Report_WEB-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E47F-YNCK].
14 Id. at 14, 31.
15 Marijuana Overview, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 17,
2019),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/marijuanaoverview.aspx [https://perma.cc/TX4C-UWCG].
16 Id.
17 See, e.g., Juan Diego Bogotá, Marihuana Medicinal: ¿cuáles Países Lideran En
América Latina? [Medical marijuana: which countries lead in Latin American?] LATIN
AMERICAN POST (June 26, 2019), https://latinamericanpost.com/28658-medicalmarijuana-which-countries-lead-in-latin-america [https://perma.cc/54B9-A92Q]
(noting that Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay have approved the
medical use of marijuana).
18
GLENN GREENWALD, DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION IN PORTUGAL: LESSONS FOR
CREATING FAIR AND SUCCESSFUL DRUG POLICIES, (CATO Institute, 2009),
https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/greenwald_whitepaper.p
pd [https://perma.cc/VNU3-LY8J].
19
Global Commission on Drug Policy, Regulation: The Responsible Control of
Drugs, supra note 13, at 11.
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in different places will need to be shaped by, and sensitive to, local
economic political, and cultural environments.”20 The approaches
sketched here draw from international experiences but aim
specifically to fit the Mexican context. Whenever convenient, rather
than advocate for a particular model, we present a spectrum of
regulatory options that could be considered in the Mexican context.
Mexico’s current security crisis is profound and complex.
Corruption and impunity are common in many public institutions,
notably in those in charge of providing justice and security. The
2017 Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Mexico 135 out of 180
countries with a score of 29 (out of 100).21 The country’s ranking has
worsened since 2012.22 Additionally, a recent report measuring the
quality of criminal justice institutions at the state level showed that
the probability of a crime being investigated in Mexico is .90
percent.23 Even violent crimes, like homicides, have extremely high
impunity levels. In the State of Guerrero for example, during 2016
the probability of a homicide being criminally punished was less
than 4 percent.24 Another report shows the difficult conditions in
which police operate throughout the country, with poor wages and
no labor stability, despite the risks involved in their work.25
Drug policy reform is a necessary but not sufficient condition to
address this crisis. It will not, on its own, solve the problem of weak
20
Global Commission on Drug Policy, Regulation: The Responsible Control of
Drugs, supra note 13, at 12–13.
21
The Corruption Perceptions Index undertaken by Transparency
International ranks 180 countries and territories by their perceived levels of public
sector corruption according to experts and businesspeople, it uses a scale of 0 to
100, where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean. Mexico’s score of 29 has gotten
worse in the last five years. It had a score of 34 in 2012, dropping to 31 and 30 in
2015 and 2016 respectively. See Corruption Perceptions Index 2017, TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL,
(Feb.
28,
2018),
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_20
17#table [https://perma.cc/46Y7-RSVB].
22
Id.
23 See GUILLERMO RAÚL ZEPEDA LECUONA, ÍNDICE ESTATAL DE DESEMPEÑO DE LAS
PROCURADURÍAS Y FISCALÍAS [STATE INDEX LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE OF THE ATTORNEY
PROSECUTION
OFFICES]
26–27
(2017),
AND
https://www.impunidadcero.org/uploads/app/articulo/49/archivo/152657558
3R54.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4DQ-9BYU].
24 Id. at 29.
25 See Causa en Común, ¿Qué piensa la policía? [What do the police think?] 5,
17
(2017),
http://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/Presentaci%C3%B3n_encuesta.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7HDS-FFUC] (aggregating police responses to various survey
questions about job security, wages, and other related topics).
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rule of law, lack of justice, or insecurity problems that Mexico has
suffered for too long. The often-precarious state of legal institutions
is a problem that, in our view, constitutes the chief obstacle for
achieving the country’s full economic, social and political
development. To tackle effectively that immense problem, a
comprehensive, ambitious, well-thought, and properly funded
reform of the pertinent institutions is indispensable. However, a
radical change in drug policy is a fundamental part of rule of law
reform. Through the criminalization of drug-related activities the
State spends scarce human, economic and institutional resources
that should be placed elsewhere. Drug policy today is also the
justification for the prosecution and incarceration of thousands of
young men and women, the impoverishment of farmers and
communities and the use of violence by the State. As stated by the
Global Commission on Drug Policy:
A new and improved global drug control regime is needed that
better protects the health and safety of individuals and communities
around the world. Harsh measures grounded in repressive
ideologies must be replaced by more humane and effective policies
shaped by scientific evidence, public health principles and human
rights standards. This is the only way to simultaneously reduce
drug-related death, disease and suffering and the violence, crime,
corruption and illicit markets associated with ineffective
prohibitionist policies.26
2. PROHIBITION
History of prohibition in Mexico
Prohibition is often justified as a means to protect public health.
A brief historic contextualization of prohibition in Mexico, however,
shows that the origins of its normative justification lie, not in the
protection of public health, but in prejudices and discrimination.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the use of
drugs such as marijuana, cocaine, and opium was not uncommon in
Mexico. Products derived from these substances were available in
pharmacies and public markets. The first attempts to regulate these
26
Global Commission on Drug Policy, Taking Control: Pathways to Drug Policies
That Work, supra note 5, at 6.
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substances in the late nineteenth century sought to protect
consumers by controlling quality.27
In the 1920s, the discourse surrounding drugs changed
dramatically as the government sought to regulate both the use and
trafficking of narcotics to address public health-related issues and
contain nascent drug trafficking networks. In 1923, drug trade was
prohibited for the first time.28
Mexico’s post-revolutionary
government was keen on international recognition, particularly
from the United States, which was advocating prohibition beyond
its borders.29 There was no evidence of serious health problems
related to drug use at the time, yet public health protection was
presented as the primary reason to adopt prohibition.30 Absurdly,
another core argument used then to support the adoption of
prohibition was the purported association of drugs with the
“degeneration of the race”.31
The Federal Criminal Code of 1931 first introduced a blanket
prohibition for certain substances in a chapter labeled “Crimes
Against Health”. Trade, production, possession, purchase, sale,
supply, traffic, and cultivation of specific substances and plants
were defined as crimes.32 What existed prior to this blanket
prohibition of substances was a series of specific bans on
adulteration and trade. Again, prohibition was justified under the
grotesque argument that drug use was “a vice that poisons and
27
Luis Astorga, Drug Trafficking in Mexico: A First General Assessment, (Mgmt.
of Soc. Transformations (MOST) & UNESCO, Discussion Paper No. 36, 1999),
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001176/117644eo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7HDS-FFUC].
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31
”Racial degeneration” is never explicitly defined in any congressional
proceedings. The concept, however, is analyzed in Campos, where the idea is
understood to be central in justifying prohibition in Mexico. According to him,
“degeneration” had, since the late nineteenth century, been used as a scientific
concept used in the West to refer to “an empirically demonstrable biological,
medical or physically fact” and not just a philosophical problem. In Mexico, it had
been used to establish a separation between pre-independence period and
modernity. Implicitly, saying that drugs would cause “degeneration of the race”
meant that people who use drugs would return to pre-colonial—i.e. indigenous—
ways of life, away from the new Europeanized life of the cities. See Isaac Campos,
Degeneration and the Origins of Mexico’s War on Drugs, 26 MEXICAN STUD. 379 (2010).
32
See Fernanda Alonso, La historia de la política mexicana de drogas en el siglo XX
[The history of Mexican drug policy in XX century], in DROGAS, POLÍTICA Y SOCIEDAD EN
AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE [DRUGS, POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA AND
THE CARRIBEAN] (Beatriz Labate & Thiago Rodrigues eds., 2015).
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deteriorates the individual and more generally, the species”.33 No
scientific or empirical evidence was given at the time to support
either that claim or the claim that there was a relevant drug-related
health problem in Mexico.
During the Lázaro Cárdenas Administration (1934-1940), the
Department of Public Health adopted a policy that briefly broke
away from prohibition. Stating that people who use drugs should
not be criminalized but treated as patients, the Cárdenas
Administration published a federal “Drug Addiction Decree,”
which launched a program for state-controlled drug distribution
and medical use. Under the Decree, users could be prescribed drugs
that were banned by the Sanitary Code, including heroin, morphine,
cocaine and cannabis. Both registered doctors and governmentcontrolled dispensaries could prescribe these substances in a
controlled manner and at a price lower than in that of the black
market. 34 The Decree also provided funding for sustaining hospitals
and dispensaries that lacked sufficient resources for users who
needed treatment or care.
The policy, although short-lived, was seemingly successful; it
drew an important number of users, especially in Mexico City, away
from the black market and into the safer, state-sponsored
distribution system.35 In 1939, Mexico defended this policy at the
XXIC Session of the Advisory Commission on Traffic in
Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, in Geneva. Government officials
argued that the new regulation was backed by scientific studies
which had been carried out by experts, both from the medical and
legal perspective. The United States, however, criticized the
proposal to further it, arguing that it would result in the
uncontrollable increase of illicit traffic and smuggling of drugs to the
United States. The United States government further pressured the
33
Código Penal Federal [CPF], Distrito Federal y Territorios Federales en
materia de fuero común y para toda la República en materia de fuero federal
[Federal District and Federal Territorites in matters of common jurisdiction and for
the entire Republic in matters of federal jurisdiction], art. 194, 1931 (Mex.),
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ref/cpf/CPF_orig_14ago31_ima.pd
f [https://perma.cc/Z5LV-76NY].
34
Reglamento Federal de Toxicomanías [Federal Regulation of Drug
Addictions], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 17-02-1940 (Mex.),
http://dof.gob.mx/nota_to_imagen_fs.php?codnota=4510267&fecha=17/02/1940
&cod_diario=191983 [https://perma.cc/24MD-HUH6].
35
See FROYLÁN ENCISO, NUESTRA HISTORIA NARCÓTICA: PASAJES PARA
(RE)LEGALIZAR LAS DROGAS EN MÉXICO [OUR NARCOTICS HISTORY: PASSAGES TO
(RE)LEGALIZING DRUGS IN MEXICO] (Debate 2015).
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Cárdenas Administration by suspending pharmaceutical trade
between the two countries. Under pressure from both the United
States government and lobbyists from the United States’
pharmaceutical companies, Mexico adopted a prohibitionist policy
once again, backtracking from the innovative program just four
months after it was launched.36
In 1947, prohibition was made stricter: higher penalties were
adopted, under the argument that Mexico had to act “for the due
fulfillment of its international obligations” and that in order to show
its commitment “with the joint action of all the governments of the
civilized countries” it had to “repress the use of drugs”37 in reference
to the Hague and Geneva Conventions of 1912, 1925, and 1933.
Mexican legislators, however, recognized that in Mexico, “addiction
had not been a serious problem in relation to policing, social or
medical issues.”38 Other than compliance with international trends,
the arguments for stricter penalties once again lacked evidence and
deepened the discriminatory undertones that inspired the original
ban. As in the 1920’s, harsher laws were justified by using what

36 See ENCINAS, ALEJANDRO, DROGAS Y PODER EL FRACASO DE LA POLÍTICA
PROHIBICIONISTA [DRUGS AND POWER THE FAILURE OF THE PROHIBITIONIST POLICY] 23–

25 (2d ed. 2016.) (recounting how the United States encouraged countries around
the world to adopt prohibitionist drug policies in response to growing drug use
domestically); ENCISO, supra note 35.
37
Exposición de motivos del proyecto de Decreto para que reforma y adiciona
los artículos 193, 194 y 197 del Código Penal para el Distrito Federal y Territorios
Federales en materia de Fuero Común y para toda la República en materia de Fuero
Federal [Statement of reasons for the draft Decree to reform and add articles 193,
194 and 197 of the Criminal Code for the Federal District and Federal Territories in
matters of common jurisdiction and for the entire Republic in matters of federal
jurisdiction], Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados [Journal of Debates
of
the
Chamber
of
Deputies]
30-09-1947
(Mex.),
http://cronica.diputados.gob.mx/DDebates/40/2do/Ord/19470930.html
[https://perma.cc/3DSA-XH2F].
38
See Dictamen del proyecto de Decreto que reforma y adiciona los artículos
193, 194 y 197 del Código Penal para el Distrito Federal y los Territorios Federales
en materia de Fuero Común y para toda la República en materia de Fuero Federal
[Opinion of the draft Decree that reforms and adds articles 193, 194 and 197 of the
Penal Code for the Federal District and the Federal Territories in matters of common
jurisdiction and for the entire Republic in matters of federal jurisdiction], Diario de
los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados [Journal of Debates of the Chamber of
Deputies]
07-10-1947
(Mex.),
http://cronica.diputados.gob.mx/DDebates/40/2do/Ord/19471007.html
[https://perma.cc/CHY6-WTDJ] (“Hasta entonces, en nuestro país, no había
surgido como un mal grave ni policiaco, ni social, ni médico el problema de los
toxicómanos.”) [“Until then, in our country, the problem of drug addicts had not
arisen as serious, police-related, social, or medical evil.”].
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today would be considered ridiculous and unacceptable arguments
such as the alleged impact drugs have on sexual preference:
From the sexual point of view, the tendency of the species is
the reproduction of the individuals, and it is in this aspect
where, fundamentally, greater degradations are observed in
the drug addicts. It seems that morphinomania produces a
setback in sexual maturity, at the initial stages of its
development, such as ‘narcissism’ and homosexuality . . .
And not only that, but drug addiction often discovers in the
addicted individual homosexual tendencies that naturally
prevent the development of the species.39
Today, under the binding Constitutional text and interpretation,
the arguments used for the establishment and enhancement of
prohibition would not stand constitutional scrutiny and would
certainly be deemed as a violation of the right to equality and the
principle of non-discrimination.40 Fortunately, the racist and
homophobic arguments that were deployed as the key support for
prohibition during the first half of the century are no longer
admissible. Nevertheless, the “crimes against health” chapter of the
Federal Criminal Code remains in force, albeit with no new
arguments to support it.
Prohibition in the post-Single Convention 1961 era
Since 1947, the criminal thrust of the ban on drugs has remained
fundamentally unaltered. However, two tendencies dominated
reforms to the legal regime throughout the second half of the 20th
Id.
The non-discrimination clause was included within the Mexican
Constitution, in the reform of August 14, 2001, when a paragraph was added, to
Article 1, where it was noted: “Queda prohibida toda discriminación motivada por
origen étnico o nacional, el género, la edad, las discapacidades, la condición social,
las condiciones de salud, la religión, las opiniones, las preferencias sexuales, el
estado civil o cualquier otra que atente contra la dignidad humana y tenga por
objeto anular o menoscabar los derechos y libertades de las personas.” [“Any
discrimination motivated by ethnic or national origin, gender, age, disabilities,
social condition, health conditions, religion, opinions, sexual preferences, civil
status or any other that attempts against human dignity and aims to annul or
undermine the rights and freedoms of individuals is prohibited.”] See Constitución
Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [CPEUM], art. 1, Diario Oficial de la
Federación [DOF] 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 27-01-2016 (Mex.),
http://www.sct.gob.mx/JURE/doc/cpeum.pdf [https://perma.cc/2N9A-RLJR].
39
40
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century: an increase in sanctions for drug related conducts and the
addition of new substances--such as MDMA and LSD--to the list of
illegal substances.41 In 1967, penalties increased in deference to the
recently entrenched international consensus on drug use: “due to its
international projection, internal repercussion, extreme gravity and
nature which is an assault on the physical and moral integrity of
man.”42 In 1974, possession for personal use was decriminalized for
people who “have a habit or need to consume” as long as the
amount of possession was “strictly necessary” for personal use.43
For “non-addicts” (a legal term) sanctions were lowered to a
minimum of six months and maximum of three years prison
sentence.44 However, for all other drug offenses, sanctions were
increased, suggesting that “the tragic increase in the illegal use of
narcotics and psychotropic drugs, mainly in the last decade”
warranted a harsher response from the State.45 Again, no evidence
was given to support this.
41
3, 4–Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), commonly known as
ecstasy (E) is a psychoactive drug primarily used as a recreational drug, whose
effects include altered sensations and increased energy, empathy and pleasure.
Lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), also known as acid, is a hallucinogenic drug,
whose effects typically include altered thoughts, feelings, and awareness of one’s
surroundings.
42
Exposición de motivos del proyecto de Decreto que reforma disposiciones
del Código Penal para el Distrito Federal y Territorios Federales en materia de
Fuero Común y para toda la República en materia de Fuero Federal [Statement of
reasons for the draft Decree to reform and add articles 193, 194 and 197 of the
Criminal Code for the Federal District and Federal Territories in matters of common
jurisdiction and for the entire Republic in matters of federal jurisdiction], Diario de
los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados, 28 de noviembre de 1967 (Mex.),
http://cronica.diputados.gob.mx/DDebates/47/1er/Ord/19671128.html
[https://perma.cc/TJB8-F3V2].
43
Código Penal Federal [CPF], art. 198, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF]
31-12-1974
(Mex.),
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ref/cpf/CPF_ref34_31dic74_ima.pd
f [https://perma.cc/FG63-3WA9].
44 Id.
45
Exposición de motivos del proyecto de reforma que incluye disposiciones
del Código Penal para el Distrito Federal y Territorios Federales en Materia de
Fuero Común y para toda la República en material de Fuero Federal, Código
Federal de Procedimientos Penales y el Código Sanitario de los Estados Unidos
Mexicanos, en Relación con Estupefacientes y Psicotrópicos [Statement of reasons
for the draft Decree to reform and add articles 193, 194 and 197 of the Criminal Code
for the Federal District and Federal Territories in matters of common jurisdiction
and for the entire Republic in matters of federal jurisdiction, Federal Code of
Criminal Procedures and the Sanitary Code of the United Mexican States, in relation
to narcotic and psychotropic drugs], Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de
Diputados,
06-12-1974
(Mex.),
http://legislacion.scjn.gob.mx/Buscador/Paginas/wfProcesoLegislativoComplet

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

120

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 41:1

In 1983, the Mexican Constitution was amended to include the
right to health. To justify this landmark step, the supermajority of
Congress defined health as a broad concept that encompassed the
provision of health care services, disease prevention, rehabilitation,
technology and regulation of products for human consumption,
including drugs (“food, beverages and medicines, narcotics and
psychotropics”).46 The 1983 constitutional amendment should have
been of great significance for drug policy, as it put health policy and
health-oriented regulation at the forefront of state priorities. Yet
when drug crimes—catalogued as “crimes against health” in the
Federal Criminal Code—were revised two years later, there was no
significant revision of prohibition, but instead the adoption of
harsher punishments. In 1985, sanctions were again increased,
stating that drug trafficking should be “considered a crime against
humanity which transcends borders and satisfies petty and selfish
interests, endangering the physical and moral health of all the
inhabitants of the planet; which is why, as far as Mexico is
concerned, we must promote programs aimed at eradicating these
evils, in all their aspects.”47

w.aspx?q=BHGCbWrG7ukiUiW/WEuu/r7I8GQqjgVu6ZuRSZ5azXHCZOKkdc9
PP9Y+ETNlPCoonBT5TPMyfoyhK+OoV+r+og==
[https://perma.cc/AFC78X9W].
46
Alejandro Madrazo & Fernanda Alonso, El derecho a la salud en el sistema
constitucional mexicano [The Right To Health in the Mexican Constitutional System]
(Legal Studies Department (DEJ) CIDE, Working Paper No. 62, 2013),
http://www.libreriacide.com/librospdf/DTEJ-62.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BWMRYV6]. During parliamentary debates leading to the constitutional amendment,
the concept of health was discussed. When exploring the “rich and vast” health
legislation that had been produced at the time, the constitutional initiative refers
matters such as “the prevention of disabilities; the rehabilitation of people with
disabilities, the supplying of organs, tissues and corpses; food, beverage and
medicine control; narcotics and psychotropic drugs control; protection of the health
of children and the elderly; improvement and care of the environment.” Later on,
the initiative also mentions “drug quality control systems” and “preventive
medicine and education for health” and links these with “mass communication.”
47
Dictamen del proyecto de Decreto que reforma disposiciones del Código
Penal para el Distrito Federal y Territorios Federales en Materia de Fuero Común y
para toda la República en materia de Fuero Federal [Dictation of the draft Decree
that reforms provisions of the Criminal Code for the Federal District and Federal
Territories in matters of common jurisdiction and for the enitre Republic in matters
of federal jurisdiction], Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados, 09-121985
(Mex.),
http://legislacion.scjn.gob.mx/Buscador/Paginas/wfProcesoLegislativoComplet
w.aspx?q=BHGCbWrG7ukiUiW/WEuu/r7I8GQqjgVu6ZuRSZ5azXGhOIa3/ENf
pEN3iy1Ok4z8Z5p6GoyQkxbunCXJrQYbxg== [https://perma.cc/AKZ3-7ZPM].
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The history of prohibition throughout the 20th century reveals
that even though drug legislation discursively aimed to protect
health, it was actually grounded in prejudice and discrimination, not
evidence. Furthermore, prohibition as a legal regime did not reflect
the constitutional inclusion of health as a fundamental right. The
few changes that reflect the introduction of a health-centered
approach were overwhelmed by increasingly punitive measures.
Like other fundamental rights, such as the right to a healthy
environment (clearly damaged by chemical eradication of crops),
the right to health has been sidelined by drug policymakers and
enforcers, in favor of violent, repressive responses which still
constitute the core of drug policy.
Changes in the enforcement of prohibition at the end of the 20th
century are also key to understanding Mexican drug policy. Mexico
acquired heightened importance as a trafficking route for Andean
cocaine into the United States as the Caribbean Sea became
increasingly patrolled in the 1980s and 1990s.48 Under changing
circumstances, trafficking organizations eventually developed the
capacity and need to recruit and train small private armies to protect
their interests. Eventually, organized crime organizations began
recruiting state officials, particularly personnel assigned to
prosecutorial tasks at the Attorney General’s office and highly
trained members of the military.49 Criminal organizations that set
up such militias used them to protect their routes, but also to expand
their operations in detriment of their competitors. Thus, by the
beginning of the 21st century, regional pockets of violence appeared
in contested territories.50
As revenues from illicit activities increased, violence and other
forms of criminality also increased, generating a sense of urgency
48
CARMEN BOULLOSA & MIKE WALLACE, A NARCO HISTORY: HOW THE UNITED
STATES AND MEXICO JOINTLY CREATED THE MEXICAN DRUG WAR Ch. 4–6
(Counterpoint Press, 2015).
49 See generally Richard Snyder and Angélica Durán Martínez, Does Illegality
Breed Violence? Drug Trafficking and State-Sponsored Protection Rackets, 52 CRIME L.
AND SOC. CHANGE 253, 262–267 (2009) (analyzing the emergence and breakdown of
state-sponsored protection rackets in Mexico and Burma); Guillermo Trejo and
Sandra Ley, Why Did Drug Cartels go to War in Mexico? Subnational Alternations, The
Breakdown of Criminal Protection, and the Onset of Large-Scale Violence, 51 COMP. POL.
STUD. 900 (2017) (showing that the removal of top- and midlevel officials within
Mexico’s state attorney’s office and judicial police, incoming governors
unknowingly triggered the outbreak of intercartel wars). RICARDO RAPHAEL, HIJO
DE LA GUERRA [SON OF WAR] (Seix Barral Biblioteca Breve, 2019), passim.
50
Snyder and Durán Martínez, supra note 49, at 267; Trejo and Ley, supra note
49.
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for the government to take further action to contain what was
perceived as a rising wave of insecurity. Rather than revisit the
punitive strategy in light of its poor results and the changing
context, the federal government’s reaction consisted of deepening
the enforcement of prohibition to an unprecedented extent. The
decision, which took place in late 2006, enhanced the enforcement of
prohibition to the extreme of using military forces to substitute
police in broad portions of the territory.51 In retrospect, it is clear
that the deepening of the war on drugs that started almost twelve
years ago has been associated with the unprecedented escalation of
violence suffered by the country. In itself, this escalation has become
a major public health problem in Mexico and has undermined the
overall capacities of the federal and local governments.52
Deepening enforcement of prohibition (2006–2018)
Starting in late 2006, Mexico’s drug policy has moved actively
into both more militarization and further centralization, with rather
poor and even perverse results, incurring in serious violations of the
Constitution.
Enhanced militarization started in late 2006 when the federal
government’s security cabinet announced the first “joint operation”
with a state government to fight organized crime. The Minister of
Interior stated in a press conference:
[W]e inform Mexicans of the launch of the Michoacan Joint
Operation, with the deployment of more than 5,000 soldiers
for this operation, activities such as eradication of illegal
crops, the establishment of checkpoints to stop narcotic
51
Laura H. Atuesta, Capítulo IV: Militarización de la lucha contra el narcotráfico:
los operativos militares como estrategia para el combate al crimen organizado [Chapter IV:
Militarization of the fight against drug trafficking: military operations as a strategy against
organized crime], in LAS VIOLENCIAS: EN BUSCA DE LA POLITICA PUBLICA DETRAS DE LA
GUERRA CONTRA LAS DROGAS [THE VIOLENCE: IN SEARCH OF PUBLIC POLICY BEHIND
THE WAR ON DRUGS] (Laura H. Atuesta & Alejandro Madrazo eds., 2018).
52
See, e.g., Oliver D. Meza, La Retracción del Estado: Cómo la Violencia Afecta la
Capacidad de Gobernar de los Municipios en México (Cuadernos de Trabajos del
Programa de Política de Drogas del Centro de Investigación y Docencia
Económicas, Cuaderno de Trabajo No. 17, 2016) [The Retraction of the State: How
Violence Affects the Capacity of Municipalities in Mexico] (Working Papers of the Drug
Policy Program of the Economic Research and Teaching Center, Working Paper No.
17, 2016)] (supporting that violence is a major public health problem in Mexico
affecting the capacities of the local governments).
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trafficking on highways and secondary roads, the fulfillment
of search and arrest warrants, as well as locating and
dismantling points of drug sale will be carried out.53
On January 4, 2007, the federal government sent another 3,500
soldiers to Tijuana, a city less than an hour away from San Diego,
California.54 On January 21, 2007, additional operations were
announced in Guerrero, Chihuahua, Durango, and Sinaloa.55 The
operation in Guerrero initially included the participation of 6,388
soldiers,56 and the Sierra Madre Joint Operation (Chihuahua,
Durango, and Sinaloa) 9,054 soldiers.57 Between 2006 and 2011, the
number of soldiers deployed across the country grew by 70 percent,
reaching 52,690.58 According to the Ministry of Defense, in 2016
there was an average of 52,000 soldiers deployed daily across the
country, a number that does not include other federal forces such as
the Marines or Federal Police. 59
As different studies have shown, the 2006 decision to further
militarize the war on drugs proved to be costly in human lives, rule
of law, crime control, and institutional capacity. State violence,
especially in contexts of low institutional capacity and corruption,
leads to further violence from criminal organizations that confront
the State’s power by increasing their capacity to deploy violence.60
The number of shoot-outs points to this fact. In 2007, the military

Id. [Translation by the authors].
Atuesta, supra note 51.
55 Mensaje de Gabinete de Seguridad del Gobierno Federal [Message from the Security
Cabinet of the Federal Government], PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPÚBLICA, (Jan. 21, 2007).
56
Atuesta, supra note 51.
57
Atuesta, supra note 51.
58
Carlos Silva Forné et al., Índice de letalidad 2008–2014: menos enfrentamientos,
misma letalidad, más opacidad [Lethality index 2008–2014: less shooting, same lethality,
more
opacity],
25
PERFILES
LATINOAMERICANOS
331
(2017),
http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S018876532017000200331&lng=en&tlng=en [https://perma.cc/Z4UR-EHBS].
59
CENTRO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS MIGUEL AGUSTÍN PRO JUÁREZ A.C.,
PERPETUAR EL FALLIDO MODELO DE SEGURIDAD [PERPETUATING THE FAILED SECURITY
MODEL]
33
(2d
ed.
2018),
https://centroprodh.org.mx/wpcontent/uploads/2018/01/InformeSeguridad.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2QX2SRWK].
60
See generally BENJAMIN LESSING, MAKING PEACE IN DRUG WAR: CRACKDOWNS
AND CARTELS IN LATIN AMERICA (2017) (arguing that aggressive crackdowns of drug
cartels in Latin America provide an incentive for cartels to retaliate, whereas
policies which encourage repression of cartel violence reduce the conflict between
the cartels and the state). See also Atuesta, supra note 51; Zedillo, supra note 6.
53
54
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reported 48 shoot-outs; by 2011 they reported 1009.61 By 2015 the
number was reduced substantially to 171, yet it remained much
higher than at the onset of the war on drugs.62 The Federal Police
also reports a tremendous increase in shoot-outs. In 2007 it reported
3; by 2012 it had increased to 143 and fell to a still very large 96 in
2015.63
The enforcement of drug laws using the military has had a
negative effect both on police and military capacity.64 The growing
use of the military is reflected in the increase in “mixed operation
bases,” permanent infrastructure from which federal forces carry
out public security tasks.65 In 2012, the National Defense Ministry
(SEDENA) reported 75 such facilities; by 2016, there were 142 bases
in 24 of Mexico’s 32 states.66 Thus, what at first was presented as a
temporary measure—the use of the military forces to control drug
cartels—is now a permanent feature of everyday life in large
portions of Mexican territory.
Further militarization of the war on drugs also had major
repercussions on the way these institutions work. Some studies
suggest an increase over time in the use of lethal force, and a
growing use of illegal practices like torture, due process violations
and even the occurrence of extrajudicial killings.67 Another study
suggests that torture and mistreatment grew significantly after
2006.68 Using information from the only existing federal prison
Forné, supra note 58, at 339, graph 1.
Catalina Pérez Correa et al., Deadly Forces: Use of Lethal Force by Mexican
Security Forces 2007–2015, in MEXICO’S HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS 33 (B. Frey & A. AnayaMúnoz eds., 2019).
63 See CENTRO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS MIGUEL AGUSTÍN PRO JUÁREZ A.C., supra
note 59, at 133.
64 See CENTRO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS MIGUEL AGUSTÍN PRO JUÁREZ A.C., supra
note 59, at 133.
65 See CENTRO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS MIGUEL AGUSTÍN PRO JUÁREZ A.C., supra
note 59, at 31.
66
See CENTRO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS MIGUEL AGUSTÍN PRO JUÁREZ A.C., supra
note 59, at 31.
67
On average, between 2007 and 2014, the Federal Police killed 4.8 civilians
for every civilian they wounded in a shoot-out. The Army killed, during that same
period, an average of 7.9 civilians for every civilian wounded in shoot-outs. The
evolution of the use of lethal force is also worrisome. For instance, in 2007 the Army
averaged 1.6 civilians killed for every civilian wounded in a shoot-out. By 2012 that
number had risen to 14.7. See Pérez Correa et al., supra note 62.
68 See Beatriz Magaloni et al., La tortura como método de investigación criminal: El
impacto de la guerra contra las drogas en México [Torture as a method of criminal
investigation: The impact of the war on drugs in Mexico], 25 POLÍTICA Y GOBIERNO 223
(2018).
61
62
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population survey, that study shows that mistreatment and violence
perpetrated against detainees increased significantly after
December of 2006.69 When observing specific types of rights
violations and institutional involvement, disaggregated by type of
crime, the data shows a general increase in alleged torture and other
forms of human rights violations during detention, especially
against people detained for drug crimes.70 Further, a Lancet
Commission report published in 2016 found a significant rise in
torture since 2006, estimating that it became 1.57 times more likely
for a detainee to be subjected to torture or abuse during detention
for a drug related crime after December 2006 than prior to that
time.71
Through prohibition, the Mexican State unintentionally created
a black market where criminal organizations have thrived and
prospered enormously. The State has responded to the existence of
the black market of its own creation and its violent participants by
deploying the most lethal response possible, contributing to an
unprecedented escalation of violence. Today, violence has in itself
become a major public health problem in Mexico and a factor for the
undermining of the overall capacities of federal and local
governments.72
In 2009, the Petty Dealing Law73 transferred responsibility for
prosecuting small-scale drug dealing and treatment of people who
use drugs to Mexico’s 32 states. One of the main objectives of that
law was to free federal resources so these could focus on the most
relevant drug crimes (such as large-scale trafficking, financing
operations, etc.). Data shows that after reaching its peak in 2007, the
federal government steadily reduced the number detentions and
prosecutions for drug crimes. According to the General Attorney’s
Office (PGR), while in 2007 there were more than 80,000 federal
arrests for drug crimes, in 2014 there were less than 14,000.74
Id. at 238
Id. at 256.
71
Joanne Csete et al., Public health and international drug policy, 387 THE LANCET
1427, 1434 (2016).
72
Meza, supra note 52.
73
The Petty Dealing Law, known in Spanish as the Ley de Narcomenudeo,
was a series of reforms to different articles of the General Health Law and the
Criminal Code.
74
Information request to Office of the General Prosecutor (PGR), No.
0001700072215,
http://www.infomex.org.mx/gobiernofederal/moduloPublico/rMedioElectP.act
ion?idFolioSol=0001700072215 [https://perma.cc/R7U7-QQTQ].
69
70

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

126

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 41:1

However, the reform was not as successful in making federal
institutions focus on the most important drug cases. Although
possession and use had been transferred to state jurisdictions
beginning in 2009, they remained the main cause of federal arrests,
constituting 56 percent of federal detentions in 2014.75 At the same
time, State authorities drastically increased arrests for drug crimes.
In 2011 official data reported 16,680 drug crimes as the cause for
individuals kept in state prisons; by 2015 that number had risen to
30,614, an increase of 83 percent in 4 years. 76
While the Petty Dealing Law was meant to be a decentralizing
one, ironically it has brought about an important encroachment of
states’ powers by the federal government. State authorities are
responsible for prosecuting minor federal drug crimes. This means
that federal legislators in fact dictate key state criminal policy
decisions. Since the mid-nineteenth century and up until 2009, state
criminal policy was strictly the domain of state legislatures. By
demanding that states persecute federal drug crimes, Congress
forces local state authorities to allocate a substantial part of their
human and institutional resources to persecuting (federal) drug
crimes, regardless of local needs and context. This represents a
centralization of criminal policy decisions and a weakening of local
autonomy unprecedented since the nineteenth century, when
federalism was adopted in Mexico as a guiding principle of
government. This form of encroachment in state criminal policy has
since expanded to other areas beyond drug crimes (such as
kidnapping, crimes related to reproductive health, and other issues).
Today, local jurisdictions are impeded by law to reform drug laws
and are thus very limited when they attempt to adopt an approach
to drug-related issues that responds to local needs.77 Attempts by
state governments to adapt their criminal policy according to local
Id.
The National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) reports crimes
sanctioned not people imprisoned. See INEGI, CENSO NACIONAL DE PROCURACIÓN
DE JUSTICIA ESTATAL 2015 [NATIONAL CENSUS OF STATE PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE 2015],
http://www.beta.inegi.org.mx/proyectos/censosgobierno/estatal/cnpje/2015/
[https://perma.cc/R7U7-QQTQ].
77
For instance, this summer the Guerrero’s state congress voted to allow for
legal cultivation and production of opioids for medical use. The vote, however,
does not become law, but rather simply initiates a legislative procedure before
federal Congress. See El Estado Mexicano de Guerrero abre el debate sobre la legalización
de la amapola [The Mexican State of Guerrero opens the debate on the legalization of the
poppy],
EL
PAÍS
(Aug.
18,
2018),
https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/08/18/mexico/1534623073_429355.html
[https://perma.cc/L64N-ZYJ4].
75
76
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needs under the new law have been successfully challenged by the
federal government.78
Medical marijuana
Mexico is sometimes perceived internationally as having a
progressive position on marijuana, particularly after being one of
the three countries calling for the UNGASS (2016) to revise the
international treaty system stemming from the 1961 Convention.
While some steps towards drug policy reform have taken place in
Mexico, in practice they have not yet limited prohibition at all.
Openness has been more discursive and symbolic than coherent and
effective.
A few months before UNGASS 2016 and after an important
Supreme Court ruling that declared prohibition of cannabis for
recreational use unconstitutional,79 two national dialogues on
cannabis were called upon by the Federal Executive and by
Congress. From that process, legal reform of health and criminal
laws was approved in 2017,80 allowing for the production and
commercialization of cannabis for medical purposes. The reform fell
short of expectations, as it failed to address the Court’s ruling
regarding recreational use of cannabis.81 Furthermore, after the
bill’s approval more than a year ago, the government has failed to
publish minimal regulations in order for licensing to begin. The
Federal Administration’s original proposal limited legalization to

78
See, e.g., Acción de Inconstitucionalidad 33/2010, Pleno de la Suprema
Corte de Justicia de la Nación [SCJN], 30 de junio de 2011 (Mex.),
http://www2.scjn.gob.mx/ConsultaTematica/PaginasPub/DetallePub.aspx?Asu
ntoID=122648 [https://perma.cc/U4YX-U4L3]; Acción de Inconstitucionalidad
21/2010, Pleno de la SCJN, 28 de junio de 2011 (Mex.),
http://www2.scjn.gob.mx/ConsultaTematica/PaginasPub/DetallePub.aspx?Asu
ntoID=120845 [https://perma.cc/6UZG-9KQX ].
79
Amparo Indirecto 237/2014, Primera sala de la SCJN, 4 de noviembre de
2015 (Mex.), https://www.sitios.scjn.gob.mx/encuentro_universitario/assets/ar237-2014-marihuana.pdf [https://perma.cc/RP8T-NB68].
80
Decreto por el que se reforman y adicionan diversas disposiciones de la Ley
General de Salud y Código Penal Federal [Decree by which various provisions of
the General Health Law and Federal Criminal Code are amended and added], DOF
19-06-2017
(Mex.),
http://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5487335&fecha=19/06/2017
[https://perma.cc/UFM6-FFQ9].
81 Id.
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the sale of imported medical cannabis products.82 Congress, in
contrast, approved national production and established a time limit
for the Executive to publish the bylaws regulating the licensing
process for medical cannabis. Both production and importation are
currently stalled, as the Executive refuses to publish the required
bylaws, even though the end of the grace period established by
Congress is long overdue. Consequently, in practice, even medical
cannabis remains illegal in Mexico.
The most significant steps towards changing drug policy have
come from the Supreme Court. In 2015, a first historic ruling held
that the administrative ban on marijuana use for recreational
purposes was unconstitutional, because it disproportionately
restricted the fundamental right to freely develop one’s
personality.83 Four more rulings holding that a blanket prohibition
of cannabis is unconstitutional have since followed,84 making the
courts decision a binding criterion for all lower tribunals to follow.85
However, not only does the law require five consecutive rulings for
the Supreme Court, a separate super-majoritarian vote by the Court
is needed to strike down any law (otherwise the rulings only protect
the plaintiffs and the law remains in force).86 The Court has already
formally notified Congress of the unconstitutionality of cannabis
prohibition, but Congress is still discussing initiatives for reform
Id.
Amparo Indirecto 237/2014, supra note 79. The ruling, commonly known
as
SMART,
can
be
found
here:
http://www.smartclub.mx/uploads/8/7/2/7/8727772/doc.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RP8T-NB68].
84
Amparo Indirecto 637/2017, Primera sala de la SCJN, 16 de mayo de 2018
(Mex.),
https://www.scjn.gob.mx/sites/default/files/listas/documento_dos/201804/AR-623-2017-180430.pdf [https://perma.cc/RP8T-NB68 ]; Amparo Indirecto
1115/2017, Primera sala de la SCJN, 11 de marzo de 2018 (Mex.),
https://www.scjn.gob.mx/sites/default/files/listas/documento_dos/201803/AR-1115-17-180316.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MJ3-9Y9G]; Amparo Indirecto
1163/2017, Segunda sala de la SCJN, 12 de julio de 2017 (Mex.),
https://www.scjn.gob.mx/sites/default/files/listas/documento_dos/201806/AR-1163-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6HL-YKZ2].
85 Reitera Primera Sala inconstitucionalidad de la prohibición absoluta del consumo
recreativo de marihuana e integra jurisprudencia [First Chamber reiterates
unconstitutionality of the absolute prohibition of the recreational use of marijuana and
integrates jurisprudence], BOLETÍN OFICIAL [OFFICIAL BULLETIN] No. 140/180, 31 de
octubre
de
2018
(Mex.),
http://www.internet2.scjn.gob.mx/red2/comunicados/noticia.asp?id=5785
[https://perma.cc/9J67-LUUW].
86
CPEUM, supra note 40, at art. 107, II, para. 3
82
83
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(which are expected to pass before April 2020).87 If Congress does
not act soon, the Court will make a general declaration which will
strike marihuana prohibition from the law.
Legalizing the possession and use as well as regulating the
supply of cannabis is not only a policy imperative in Mexico today,
it is also a constitutional one, but Mexico’s rather cumbersome
constitutional justice system has so far failed to make it a reality.
3. PROHIBITION, VIOLENCE AND PEOPLE WHO USE DRUGS
Prohibition and its purported enforcement have had devastating
effects in Mexico. As a policy, drug prohibition has failed to protect
public and individual health and undermined State institutions.
The decision of the Mexican government to deepen the enforcement
of prohibition and persecute organized criminal organizations,
using the most violent tools at hand, rather than undermining its
access to enormous economic resources, has driven violence to
unprecedented levels, affecting individual lives and communities
deeply.
This section reviews some of the most negative consequences of
current policies, specifying how current laws and the application of
policies explain them. It shows how homicidal violence since the
outset of the war on drugs has risen to the point of becoming a public
health problem, as well as causing the displacement and
disappearance of thousands of people. It then explains how,
although current laws and policies purportedly aim to protect the
health of both potential users and people who use drugs, they in fact
negatively affect the rights of both these groups.
The epidemic of violence. Violence as a harm to public health:
homicides, internally displaced populations and disappearances
In Mexico, prohibition has led to an unprecedented human
tragedy as shown by the massive numbers of people killed,
displaced or disappeared. Sadly, the government’s wrongheaded

87
Silvia Arellano, Corte da prórroga a Senado para regular marihuana, MILENIO
DIARIO (Nov. 2, 2019), https://www.milenio.com/politica/marihuana-corteprorroga-senado-regular [https://perma.cc/8L62-RU7A].

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

130

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 41:1

drug policy seems to be at the root of the current Mexican security
and justice crisis.
Between 2006 and 2017, 254,633 homicides occurred in the
country.88 In 2006 the National Institute of Statistics (INEGI)
reported 10,452 homicides.89 By 2011, it reached an annual peak of
27,213 and then waned slightly during the following years with
24,559 homicides reported in 2016.90 But the trend has accelerated
upward again in 2017 when, according to the latest reports, the
figure reached over 31,000 homicides.91 For more than two decades
Mexico had enjoyed a sustained and prolonged drop in homicide
rates, reaching a historic low with 8 homicides per 100,000
inhabitants in 2007.92 As the bulk of federal forces were deployed to
enforce prohibition that trend, however, was abruptly ended and
homicide rates rapidly started to increase—by 50 percent in 2008
and by the same percentage again in 2009, when that rate reached 20
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (a different estimate placed
homicide rates at 24 per 100,000 in 2009).93
In several studies, the government’s operativos conjuntos—the
core of Mexico’s strategy against organized crime involving drug
trafficking—have been causally linked to the rise in homicides.94
88
INEGI, MORTALIDAD, CONJUNTO DE DATOS: DEFUNCIONES POR HOMICIDIOS,
INFORMACIÓN DE 1990 A 2018 [MORTALITY, DATA SET: HOMICIDES, INFORMATION FROM
1990
TO
2018]
(2019),
http://www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/olap/proyectos/bd/continuas/mortalidad/
defuncioneshom.asp?s=est [https://perma.cc/SD8C-V626].
89 Id.
90 Id.
91
While most of these deaths were men, homicide rates for women have risen
at a similar pace, with 1,298 deaths in 2006 and a peak of 3,324 in 2017. See id.
92
Fernando Escalante, Homicidios 2008-2009. La muerte tiene permiso [Homicide
(Jan.
1,
2011),
2008–2009.
Death
has
permission],
NEXOS
https://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=14089 [https://perma.cc/M4NE-BKAS].
93
Id.
94
Several studies have established some type of causality between the
security strategy implemented by the 2006–2012 administration and the increase in
violence observed in the country since 2008. See, e.g., Atuesta, supra note 51; Laura
Atuesta & Aldo Ponce, Meet the Narco: Increased Competition Among Criminal
Organizations and the Explosion of Violence in Mexico, 18 GLOB. CRIME 375, 376 (2017)
(explaining that increased intervention by law enforcement increases the number
of assassinations and unrest, which leads to the creation of more criminal
organizations); Gabriela Calderón et al., The Beheading of Criminal Organizations and
the Dynamics of Violence in Mexico, 59 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1455, 1456 (2015) (linking
the dramatic increase in homicide rates in 2006 to the start of President Calderon’s
campaign against drug cartels); Valeria Espinosa & Donald B. Rubin, Did the
Military Interventions in the Mexican Drug War Increase Violence?, 69 AM. STATISTICIAN
17, 24 (2015) (claiming military intervention in the drug war caused in increase in
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The mechanisms through which this happens are still unclear, but
existing data highlights two main findings: First, a rise in homicide
rates takes place in localities where operativos conjuntos against
organized crime have been deployed. Second, that increase is more
pronounced when military forces are involved (as opposed to
federal civil forces like the Federal Police).95
The increase in homicides has been so pronounced that it has
had a direct negative impact on life expectancy: for the first time in
over six decades, life expectancy dropped in Mexico. Though the
national drop was only 0.6 percent between 2005 and 2010, certain
regions most affected by the war on drugs showed a higher
decrease.96 In Chihuahua, Sinaloa, and Durango life expectancy
decreased by three years over the same period.97 This drop in life
expectancy occurred at a time when there were substantial positive
changes in other health indicators and causes of death in the
country. This means that the possible positive effects of inclusive
health policies and their improvements have been exceeded and
overwhelmed by the negative health impact of the violence caused
by the attempts to enforce the ill-conceived drug policy.
Moreover, violence permeates the population and creates
numerous health problems: somatic, psychological and behavioral.
Homicides are not the sole negative impact of drug-war-driven
violence on public health. Violence begets violence: young people
the average homicide rate); Javier Osorio, The Contagion of Drug Violence:
Spatiotemporal Dynamics of the Mexican War on Drugs, 59 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1403,
1407 (2015) (proposing a theory of criminal competition whereby government
intervention reduces the power of one criminal organization and therefore
encourages a rival organization to strike its weakened competitor); Brian J. Phillips,
How Does Leadership Decapitation Affect Violence? The Case of Drug Trafficking
Organizations in Mexico, 77 J. POLITICS 324, 326 (2015) (explaining why leadership
decapitation can sometimes have the unintended effect of increasing levels of
violence); José Merino, Los operativos conjuntos y la tasa de homicidios: una medición
[Joint operations and the homicide rate: a measurement], NEXOS, (June 1, 2011),
https://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=14319 [https://perma.cc/2TRJ-ZEW7] (using
statistical tools to argue that the strong correlation between government
intervention and violence is causal).
95
On average, during the first five years of the drug war, each shoot-out
between authorities and organized criminals produced a 6 percent rise in the
homicide rate in that locality within three months. The compound increase is
staggering in localities with tens or even hundreds of such exchanges. Where the
armed forces are used, the average increase is by 8 percent, but when the Army is
used, the increase is of 9 percent. See Atuesta, supra note 51, at 24–26.
96
José Manuel Aburto et al., Homicides in Mexico Reversed Life Expectancy Gains
for Men and Slowed Them for Women, 2000–10, 35 HEALTH AFF. 88, 88 (2016).
97 Id. at 90–91.
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who are victims of violence are at higher risk of perpetrating
violence with fire-arms themselves.98 Also, being a victim of
violence raises the risk of depression, alcohol abuse, suicidal
behavior, and psychological problems, among other negative
consequences on health.99 For instance, exposure to the recent
escalation of violence in Mexico is associated with lower weight at
birth of children born to women of scarce economic resources and
children born to women with mental health problems.100 Merely
witnessing violence may affect the health of the exposed population
by increasing the rates of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and
depression.101 A 2015 study analyzed not only the mortality rates in
Mexico, but also the psychological wellbeing of those affected by
violence.102 In this study, researchers measured the fear and
perceived vulnerability (feeling unsafe) in the population. 103 The
findings show that between 2005 and 2014 the average number of
years that individuals live feeling at risk from violence increased
considerably.104

98
See, e.g., Paula Braveman & Laura Gottlieb, The Social Determinants of Health:
It’s Time to Consider the Causes of the Causes, 129 PUB. HEALTH REP. 19, 22 (2014) (“For
instance, exposure to violence can increase the likelihood that young people will
perpetrate gun violence”).
99
Jonathan R. T. Davidson et al., The Association of Sexual Assault and Attempted
Suicide Within the Community, 53 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 550, 553 (1996).
100
See Ryan Brown, The Mexican Drug War and Early-Life Health: The Impact of
Violent Crime on Birth Outcomes, 55 DEMOGRAPHY 319, 326 (2018) (discussing the
relationship between in utero exposure to violence and birth weight).
101
See, e.g., Stephen L. Buka et al., Youth Exposure to Violence: Prevalence, Risks,
and Consequences, 71 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 298, 302-303 (2001) (analyzing the
mental health effects on children and adolescents who witnessed community
violence).
102
Vladimir Canudas-Romo et al., Mexico’s Epidemic of Violence and its Public
Health Significance on Average Length of Life, 71 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY
HEALTH 188 (2017).
103
Id. at 189 (defining vulnerability as the respondent’s perception of crime
based on answers to the question “In terms of crime, how do you consider living in
your state and in your home?” with two response options, vulnerable and safe).
104
Id. at 192. In 2014, female life expectancy at age 20 was 59.5 years (95
percent CI 59.0 to 60.1); 71 percent of these years (42.3 years, 41.6 to 43.0) were spent
with perceived vulnerability of violence taking place in the state and 26 percent at
the home (15.3 years, 15 to 15.8). For males, life expectancy at age 20 was 54.5 years
(53.7 to 55.1); 64 percent of these years (34.6 years, 34.0 to 35.4) were lived with
perceived vulnerability of violence at the state and 20 percent at the home (11.1
years, 10.8 to 11.5).
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Graph 1: Yearly deaths due to illegal drugs, homicides and other
public health issues105
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Violence among cartels and between cartels and government
forces places innocent people in the crossfire. Because of this, an
increasing number of people leave their homes in search of refuge.
Forced displacement is also a tactic used by criminals to empty
ranches and villages in order to grab land and natural resources. A
2017 report by the Mexican Commission for the Defense and
Promotion of Human Rights concluded that at least 329,917 people
have been internally displaced in Mexico since 2006.106 This NGO

105
Chart created with data from the INEGI’s record of homicides from 1990
to 2016 and the 2006-2016 mortality databases from the National System for Health
Information. Conjunto de Datos: Defunciones por Homicidios, [Dataset: Deaths by
Homicide], INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ESTADÍSTICA Y GEOGRAFÍA, [NATIONAL INSTITUTE
STATISTICS
AND
GEOGRAPHY],
OF
https://www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/olap/proyectos/bd/continuas/mortalidad
/defuncioneshom.asp?s=est [https://perma.cc/SD8C-V626].
106
COMISIÓN MEXICANA DE DEFENSA Y PROMOCIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS
(CMDPDH), EPISODIOS DE DESPLAZAMIENTO INTERNO FORZADO MASIVO EN MÉXICO
INFORME 2017 [EPISODES OF FORCED AND MASSIVE INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN MEXICO.
2017 REPORT] 8 (2017), http://www.cmdpdh.org/publicaciones-pdf/cmdpdh-
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registered 25 episodes of mass forced displacements in 2017 alone.107
According to the same report, the main—but not the only—cause of
displacement that year was violence generated by organized armed
criminal groups, which accounts for 68 percent of the total number
of episodes.108 Another study states that there were 123,000
internally displaced persons in 2010, and that number has increased
steadily, reaching 311,000 by 2016.109 Between 2006 and 2015,
population rates decreased in 691 municipalities, 28 percent of the
country’s total number, with most of these municipalities located in
three regions most affected by violence.110 Overall, the number of
people leaving violent municipalities in Mexico is four to five times
higher than that of those leaving non-violent municipalities with
similar socio-economic conditions.
However, to date, the
government only acknowledges a fraction of the internally
displaced population making it difficult to assess and address the
magnitude of the problem. 111
People who have been forced to move rarely have access to legal
mechanisms or institutions for protection or assistance. Local
informe-de-desplazamiento-interno-masivo-en-mexico-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E675-DQ5Z].
107
A mass episode of forced internal displacement occurs when families (in a
number equaling or greater than ten) or groups of people (equaling or greater than
fifty individuals in total) are obligated to collectively abandon their place of
residence, as a reactive or preventative measure when faced with a situation of
widespread violence. The episodes registered in 2017 displaced around 20,390
people and affected at least nine states, twenty-seven municipalities, and seventynine localities. See id. at 9.
108
Other causes registered over the year were political violence, social
conflict, territorial conflict, and mining extraction projects. Furthermore, the
CMDPDH’s research identified the forms of violence that originated or that were
present during these displacements. The most frequently registered were: armed
attacks against communities; armed confrontations between criminal groups or
between these and state agents; threats and intimidation; burning or destruction of
houses, crops, businesses, and vehicles. See id. at 10.
109
These figures were obtained by the Internal Displacement Monitoring
Centre (IDMC) and are available on their Mexico profile page at: http://internaldisplacement.org/countries/mexico/ [https://perma.cc/MAU2-PACU]. Most
recent 2016 estimates are based on a preview of a forthcoming report prepared by
the CMDPHD.
110 Id.
111
See, e.g., Laura H. Atuesta & Dusan Paredes, Do Mexicans Flee from Violence?
The Effects of Drug-Related Violence on Migration Decisions in Mexico, 42 J. ETHN. MIGR.
STUD. 480 (2015) (“However, up to now, the government has not recognised the
existence of the internally displaced population (IDP) and there is no data to assess
the magnitude of the problem neither to estimate the economic consequences of
that displacement.”).
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governments often lack the capacity to guarantee and protect the
rights of displaced populations. In addition to problems related to
their personal safety, internally displaced populations need
assistance with basic survival issues, such as shelter, health services,
drinking water, sanitation, clothing, and food. The existing health
care services in Mexico, however, often lack the capacity to respond
to these basic needs, much less provide broader psychological and
physical care for this population.
In addition to homicides and displacements, the war on drugs
has also left the country with a large number of missing persons.
According to the Mexican government, since 2006, over 35,000
people have disappeared in the country, and the number seems to
be growing.112 From 2006 to 2012, 13,767 people disappeared.113
From December 2012 to April 2018, 23,236 people were reported
missing or disappeared.114 Many of these cases are accused of being
enforced disappearances, in which presumably authorities were
involved.115 Unfortunately very few cases are investigated. For
example, by 2016, Mexico had informed the United Nations of only
fourteen convictions for enforced disappearances, six of which
occurred before 2006.116

112 See SECRETARIADO EJECUTIVO DEL SISTEMA NACIONAL DE SEGURIDAD
PÚBLICA, REGISTRO NACIONAL DE DATOS DE PERSONAS EXTRAVIADAS o DESAPARECIDAS
(RNPED) [NATIONAL REGISTRY OF DATA OF LOST OR MISSING PERSONS (RNPED)],
http://secretariadoejecutivo.gob.mx/rnped/datos-abiertos.php
[https://perma.cc/E675-DQ5Z].
113
See Open Society Justice Initiative, Corrupción que Mata: Por qué México
Necesita un Mecanismo Internacional para Combatir la Impunided [Corruption that Kills:
Why Mexico Requires an International Mechanism to Combat Impunity], 22 (2018),
https://www.justiceinitiative.org/uploads/39bec249-a57e-4f26-aeaa160acd0088dd/corruption-that-kills-es-20180502.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7YLLRGXJ].
114 See RNPED, supra note 112.
115
According to a study by the Observatory on Disappearances and Impunity,
out of 548 cases of disappearances committed between 2005 and 2015 in the state of
Nuevo Leon and adjacent states, 46.7 percent had a state authority reported as the
offender. See Observatorio de Desapariciones e Impunidad, Informe Sobre
Desapariciones En El Estado De Nuevo León, 2016 [Observatory of Disappearences and
Impunity, Report On Disappearances In The State Of Nuevo León, 2016] (FLACSO 2016),
http://www.flacso.edu.mx/sites/default/files/170616_resumen_informe_nl_vf.
pdf [https://perma.cc/R8NY-TSQ8] (presenting the study report).
116
Open Society Justice Initiative, supra note 113, at 25.
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People who use drugs
If the constitutional right to health were taken seriously, people
who use drugs would be treated very differently. In practice, drug
users are not the subjects of a serious public health policy; rather,
they are most often treated as criminals. Although technically the
use of illegal drugs is not a crime, the criminalization of all drugrelated conduct—including possession—leads effectively to the
criminalization of individuals who use drugs. People who use
drugs are particularly vulnerable to arbitrary application of state
force, including illegal detention, torture, and imprisonment.
Existing data suggests that people who use drugs are often the main
target of repressive efforts by government. At the same time, health
services offered to people with problematic drug use are scarce,
inadequate, and tend to be poorly regulated and policed, be they
private or public.117
People who use drugs and the criminal justice system
People who use drugs are the most frequently targeted by the
criminal justice system for breaking drug laws. Although drug use
is not a crime, users are forced to participate in a market that is
clandestine and controlled by criminal organizations. They are
directly brought into the criminal justice system when charged with
drug possession, which is a crime in Mexico. Because possession
necessarily precedes use, people who use drugs formally commit a
crime every time they use.118
Possessing any amount of illegal drugs warrants arrest and the
opening of a criminal investigation file, regardless of circumstance.
According to Mexico’s Health Law, possession of up to 5 grams of
marijuana, 0.5 grams of cocaine, 50 milligrams of heroin, 40
milligrams of methamphetamines or 2 grams of opium, remains a
crime and must be investigated by the public prosecutor, but “shall

117
See EN BUSCA DE LOS DERECHOS: USUARIOS DE DROGAS Y LAS RESPUESTAS
ESTATALES EN AMÉRICA LATINA [IN THE QUEST FOR RIGHTS: DRUG USERS AND STATE
RESPONSES IN LATIN AMERICA] (Catalina Pérez Correa & Coletta Youngers eds., 2015),

http://www.drogasyderecho.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/reportecompleto.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJ3C-YXCE].
118 Id.
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not be punished.”119 This means that a criminal investigation is to
be opened and the accused person may be subject to temporary
detention, especially if caught in the act of possession. However, if,
upon conclusion of the investigation, the amounts are shown to be
within the thresholds, the case will not be filed before a judge but
instead reported to health authorities.120 If the amounts possessed
are above the thresholds—which are notoriously low compared to
thresholds established in other Latin American countries like
Uruguay or Colombia—mere possession will result in prosecution
and incarceration. This threshold system is often invoked as a
progressive policy adopted with the 2009 amendment to the General
Health Law to decriminalize possession. However, corruption,
inadequate police training,121 and an inefficient justice system have
rendered depenalization mute. In this context, the Petty Dealing
Law has increased harm to people who use drugs. Lacking proper
skills to investigate crime and often asked to reach arrest quotas,
regardless of the specific crimes, police and prosecutors find in
young people who use drugs easy cases, as drug possession requires
no investigation beyond possession itself. The ease with which
police can report drug amounts which exceed these thresholds
makes extortion by police a common practice.122
According to the National Institute of Statistics and Geography
(INEGI), in 2015, states reported 50,083 criminal investigations
opened in state jurisdictions for drug related crimes.123 These
investigations were opened under the Petty Dealing Law. Simple
possession—that is, possession without intent to sell or supply—
represented 65 percent of the open investigations, while possession

119 See Ley General de Salud [General Health Law] (LGS) art. 479, Diario
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 12 de julio de 2018 (Mex.),
http://www.salud.gob.mx/cnts/pdfs/LEY_GENERAL_DE_SALUD.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6BXT-H9J8].
120
Id.
121
See Annick Borquez et al., The Effect of Public Health-Oriented Drug Law
Reform on HIV Incidence in People who Inject Drugs in Tijuana, Mexico: an Epidemic
LANCET
PUBLIC
HEALTH
(2018),
Modelling
Study,
THE
https://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lanpub/PIIS2468-2667(18)300975.pdf [https://perma.cc/2J5P-TTQ5].
122
EN BUSCA DE LOS DERECHOS, [IN THE QUEST FOR RIGHTS], supra note 117.
123 See Censo Nacional de Gobierno, Seguridad Pública y Sistema Penitenciario
Estatales 2016 [National Government Census, Public Safety and the State Penitentiary
System
2016],
INEGI,
http://www.beta.inegi.org.mx/proyectos/censosgobierno/estatal/cngspspe/201
6/ [https://perma.cc/7WR4-XQ3E].
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with intent to sell or supply represented 17.5 percent.124 Sale and
supply comprised a mere 1.7 percent of all local investigations.125
Regarding incarceration, many states do not keep track of the
specific drug related criminal offences committed and sanctioned in
their prisons.126 Where information is available, possession is
consistently the most frequently sanctioned drug crime. As to what
type of drug is involved, in 40 percent of the cases the information
is not available.127 Where information is available, marijuana is the
most frequent substance (32 percent), followed by cocaine (13
percent) and methamphetamines (12 percent).128
Once processed through the criminal justice system, people who
use drugs face a prison system that is hazardous to health. Prisons
are high-risk environments for numerous diseases. There is a high
prevalence of HIV due to shared use of needles for drug injection
and tattooing with homemade and unsterilized kits, as well as highrisk sex and rape.129 According to the UN, globally, in 2012, the
prevalence rates among the prison population of HIV was 6.7
percent, Hepatitis B was 4.4 percent and Hepatitis C reached 10
percent, much higher than those seen in the general population (i.e.
HIV prevalence is 0.3 percent for the general population).130
Tuberculosis in prisons is, on average, twenty-three times higher
than in the general population.131 In 2008, the likelihood of dying if

Id.
The remaining 16 percent were classified as “other” which could refer to
investigations initiated for possession under the thresholds or else investigations of
drug crimes which were deemed to fall within federal jurisdiction and accordingly
transferred. See id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129
See SERGIO CHAPARRO & CATALINA PÉREZ CORREA, SOBREDOSIS CARCELARIA Y
POLÍTICA DE DROGAS EN AMÉRICA LATINA [PRISON OVERDOSE AND DRUG POLICY IN LATIN
AMERICA]
(Dejusticia,
Working
Paper
No.
41,
2017),
https://www.dejusticia.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/SobredosiscarcelariaypoliticadedrogasenAmericaLatin
a.pdf?x54537 [https://perma.cc/W5SN-NSNS].
130 Id.
131
Iacopo Baussano et al., Tuberculosis Incidence in Prisons: A Systematic Review,
MEDICINE
(2010),
7
PLOS
https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.100038
1 [https://perma.cc/9AQQ-GSWL].
124
125
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one was in a Mexican prison was five times greater than if one was
not in a Mexican prison.132
Graph 2: Micro-dealing crimes sanctioned in state prisons, by sex,
2015 (local jurisdiction)133
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who are in frequent contact with the prison population. Mexico
City’s prisons alone have over 3 million visitors per year.134 For
families of inmates, incarceration also has severe economic, health,
and social costs. The imprisonment of a family member often leads
to economic vulnerability and stigmatization. This is particularly

132
Guillermo Zepeda Lecuona, Índice De Desempeño Del Sistema Penal
[Performance Index Of The Criminal Justice System Index], MÉXICO EVALÚA (Nov. 10,
2010),
https://www.mexicoevalua.org/2010/11/10/indice-de-desempeno-delsistema-penal/ [ https://perma.cc/JG53-EB36].
133
National Census of Government, Public Security and State Prison Systems
of 2016, INEGI,
http://www.beta.inegi.org.mx/proyectos/censosgobierno/estatal/cngspspe/201
6/ [https://perma.cc/7WR4-XQ3E].
134
Catalina Pérez Correa, Las mujeres invisibles: Los costos de la prisión y los
efectos indirectos en las mujeres [Invisible women: the costs of prison and the indirect effects
on women] (Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, Working Paper No. IBD-DP-405,
2015), https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/7235 [https://perma.cc/28FJFGD3].
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true for women, as they are usually the ones who provide basic
necessities for their family members in prison.135
Prevention, treatment and harm reduction for people who
use drugs
Evolution of drug use in Mexico cannot be properly assessed, as
the national surveys regarding drug use published over the years
are not comparable to each other.136 Nevertheless, the available data
suggests that use of illegal drugs has increased, despite harsh
prohibition policies, as Table 1 shows. 137 It is important to point out
that only 0.6 percent of the population reported a drug use disorder
(1.1 percent men, 0.2 percent in women).138

135
A 2014 survey of people visiting family members in Mexican prisons
indicated similar kinds of challenges in that setting. Of the visitors, who were
mostly women, more than 50 percent said that because of the imprisonment of a
spouse or family member they had had to get a job or an additional job. By contrast
41 percent said that they had lost a job, more than 18 percent said that they had had
to move, and almost 40 percent said the imprisonment had impeded their ability to
care for their children or grandchildren. A range of health problems also
disproportionately affected spouses of those incarcerated, including high blood
pressure and depression. Id.
136
Beatriz C. Labate & Pamela Ruiz Flores López, Midiendo el uso de Drogas
ilegales en México: Reflexiones sobre las Encuestas Nacionales de Adicciones y una encuesta
independiente [Measuring the use of illegal Drugs In Mexico: Reflections on National
Addiction Surveys and an independent survey] (Drug Policy Workshop (PPD) CIDE,
Working
Paper
No.
13,
2015),
http://ppd.cide.edu/documents/302668/0/Midiendo%20el%20uso%20de%20dr
ogas%20ilegales%20en%20México.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4XZ-E8VN ].
137
According to the National Survey on Consumption of Drugs, Alcohol and
Tobacco 2016-2017 (ENCODAT), use by women increased disproportionately, with
any drug increasing from 0.7 percent to 1.3 percent, illegal drugs from 0.4 percent
to 1.1 percent and marijuana from 0.3 to 0.9 percent. Youth use (12-17 years) has
also gone up from 0.6 percent to 3.1 percent for any drug, 1.5 percent to 2.9 percent
for illegal drugs, and 0.6 percent to 2.1 percent in marijuana. The group with the
highest rates of use remains men between 18-34 years. Instituto Nacional de
Psiquiatría Ramón de la Fuente Muñiz et al., Encuesta Nacional de Consumo de Drogas,
Alcohol y Tabaco 2016–2017 (Encodat): Reporte de Drogas [National Drug, Alcohol, and
Tobacco Consumption Survey 2016-2017 (ENCODAT): Drug Report] (2017), [herinafter
ENCODAT]
https://www.gob.mx/salud%7Cconadic/acciones-yprogramas/encuesta-nacional-de-consumo-de-drogas-alcohol-y-tabaco-encodat2016-2017-136758 [https://perma.cc/NRN3-XKRU].
138
Id.
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Table 1: Percentage of adult population (12–65 years old) who used
at least once in the last year139
Drug
Illegal drugs
Marijuana
Cocaine
Methamphetamine

2002
0.8
0.6
0.3
-

2008
1.4
1
0.4
0.1

2011
1.5
1.2
0.5
0.2

2016
2.7
2.1
0.8
0.2

Specific regions have more pronounced increases than the
national average, and these regions are those in the country
suffering the most from violence due to trafficking and prohibition
enforcement.140 Violence and its impact on well-being could partly
explain the possible rise, but it should not be discarded that efforts
to intercept drugs going to the U.S. border lead to substances being
retained and dispersed in the Mexican territory. This especially
appears to be the case in border cities like Tijuana.141
Drug use in Mexico, however, is still below global rates, and
even drug dependence estimates for Mexico (6 percent of Mexico’s
people use drugs) are significantly lower than worldwide estimates
(11 percent).142
Id.
In the North Central region of Mexico, for example, rates rose from 1.6
percent to 3.3 percent. The North-West and North-East regions are also above the
national averages going from 2.8 percent to 3.5 percent and staying at 2.4 percent
respectively. The West has also seen an enormous rise from 3.6 percent. Other
border states in the North that already had high rates, such as Baja California (from
4.1 percent to 4.4 percent) and Chihuahua (from 3.3 to 3.4 percent) remain so. See
ENCODAT, supra note 137.
141
As the United States has tightened security along the border, drugs have
pooled on the Mexican side. Mid and low-level distributors are pushing not only
heroin, but also meth out into the local markets, particularly along the border. This
has been documented in local newspapers. See Yerson Martínez, Aumenta BC el
consumo de heroína y “cristal” [BC increases the consumption of heroin and “crystal”],
FRONTERA
INFO
(Aug.
30,
2016),
http://www.frontera.info/EdicionEnLinea/Notas/Noticias/30082016/1121859Aumenta-BC-el-consumo-de-heroina-y-cristal.html)
[https://perma.cc/GA29YZKT]. It has also been documented in treatment centers. See Eneida Sánchez
Zambrano & Rubén Gómez, Adicciones en Baja California, ausentes en políticas públicas
[Addiction in Baja California, absentabsence in public policies], LA JORNADA BAJA
CALIFORNIA (Feb. 13, 2015), http://jornadabc.mx/tijuana/13-02-2015/adiccionesen-baja-california-ausentes-en-politicas-publicas)
[https://perma.cc/JR4MXDW4].
142
According to UNODC’s World Drug Report 2017, it is estimated that 5
percent or a quarter of a billion people between the ages of fifteen and sixty-four
years, used at least one drug in 2015, while 3.8 percent of the adult population used
139
140
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The government’s investment in prevention and treatment pales
in comparison to its investment in punishment. Between 2006 and
2012, 97.07 percent ($790 billion pesos) of total spending on drug
policy was allocated to law enforcement while only 2.91 percent ($23
billion pesos) was spent on prevention and treatment (including
related human rights programs).143 Yet the prevention effort, as
small as it is, seems to yield results: 5.1 percent of those exposed to
prevention programs report having used drugs, compared to 12.3
percent of people who have not had access to prevention services
and campaigns.144 Positive outcomes of prevention are more
noticeable amongst youths: 3.3 percent of 12—17-year-olds reported
as using drugs after exposure to prevention programs, in contrast to
the 10.3 percent who used drugs but had not been exposed to
prevention programs.145 In spite of these tangible results, the
percentage of the population exposed to prevention programs has
grown only marginally between 2011 and 2016 (from 43.3 to 47.1
percent).146
People who suffer from problematic drug use have limited
access to treatment, particularly for science-based services.
According to the ENCODAT, of the people who reported
problematic drug use, only one out of five (20.4 percent) received
treatment (22.1 percent of men, 12.8 percent of women), and only
24.5 percent completed it.147 Several barriers to accessing treatment
exist, especially for women.148 For people who wanted to receive
marijuana. Mexico’s numbers are well below that, at 2.7 percent for all illegal drugs
and 2.1 percent for marijuana. See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME,
WORLD
DRUG
REPORT
9
(2017),
https://www.unodc.org/wdr2017/field/Booklet_1_EXSUM.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H6ZX-U2FA].
143
Gabriel Purón-Cid, El Impacto Económico de una Política de Drogas
Prohibicionista 2006–2012 [The Economic Impact of a Drug Prohibition Policy 2006-2012]
(Drug Policy Workshop (PPD) CIDE, Working Paper No. 3, CIDE 2014).
144 See ENCODAT, supra note 137.
145
See ENCODAT, supra note 137.
146 See ENCODAT, supra note 137, at Cuadro TD10 (“Población de 12 a 65 años
que le han ofrecido alguna droga regalada o comprada según sexo y edad”
[“Population ages 12 to 65 years old who have been offered, given, or bought any
drug, according to sex and age”].).
147
We don’t know what the rate of relapse was. Surprisingly, even though
women access treatment much less frequently than men, of those women who did
get treatment, 90.5 percent completed it, while only 19.8 percent of men did. See
ENCODAT, supra note 137.
148
According to the ENCODAT, supra note 137, 8 percent of people who use
drugs and 20.4 percent of people with drug use disorder underwent treatment.
However, numbers are two or three times lower for women (3.9 percent of women
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treatment, the lack of economic resources, distance, lack of quality
of services, and stigma associated with drug use were identified as
being amongst the main barriers to accessing treatment.149
Problematic drug use is managed through special units in public
health centers. The great majority of these are outpatient programs.
There are only 43 public residential centers where people can be
interned.150 Private residential facilities with standardized quality
care can cost anywhere between 3,500 to 16,000 USD for a forty-fiveday treatment,151 a price outside the reach of most of Mexico’s
population. People with insufficient economic resources, living in
areas of extreme poverty and scarcity of public services, go to what
are known as anexos or granjas (51.1 percent of men and 22.9 percent
of women who reported accessing treatment). 152 These are low-cost
private centers, mostly operating outside the law, with no official
supervision.153
Government data estimates that there are
approximately 2,300 residential rehabilitation centers, of which only
16 percent are registered with health authorities and only 12 percent

who use drugs and 12.8 percent of women with drug dependence to respective 9.3
percent and 22.1 percent of men). The study also mentions that women mainly go
to individual non-group therapies, which could be due to stigma and harassment.
149
According to the ENCODAT, supra note 137, of those who actually did
want to go to treatment, the top reasons for not getting help include the following:
do not know where to go (11.7 percent), do not want to be committed against their
will (10.6 percent), thought that the treatment would not help (9.8 percent), do not
have enough economic resources (9.6 percent), thought it would take too long (8.8
percent), treatment centers are far from their residence (8.5 percent), did not go
because of shame (8.2 percent), were not satisfied with the services available (7.5
percent) were concerned about what people would think (7.0 percent) and couldn’t
go because medical insurance does not cover it (6.0 percent).
150 See ENCODAT, supra note 137.
151 See ENCODAT, supra note 137.
152 See ENCODAT, supra note 137.
153 For a more detailed description of annexes and where they are found, see
ENCODAT, supra note 137, and Brian Anderson et al., Regulación repensada: la
necesidad de nuevas políticas y normas en el tratamiento de las adicciones [Regulation
rethought: the need for new policies and regulations in the treatment of addictions], in LAS
VIOLENCIAS: EN BUSCA DE LA POLÍTICA PÚBLICA DETRÁS DE LA GUERRA CONTRA LAS
DROGAS [VIOLENCES: IN SEARCH OF PUBLIC POLICY BEHIND THE WAR ON DRUGS] (Laura
Atuesta & Alejandro Madrazo eds., CIDE 2018).
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comply with government regulation.154 Some states in the country,
like Oaxaca, have only one registered center for the entire state.155
There is no regular or systematic monitoring of practices in
anexos and granjas, but conditions are consistently reported as
troubling and treatment as not based on medical or scientific
principles. According to Mexican law, enrollment in treatment
centers must be “strictly voluntary.” 156 However, studies and
human rights reports based on patient interviews, disclose
involuntary retention, often in violent conditions. 157 Interviewees
describe physical abuse, including punishments for minor
infractions (not sitting up straight or not paying attention), which
include kneeling on metal bottle caps for hours, sitting on cactuses
or a jagged brick, isolation rooms, being struck with sticks, or going
without food. Many centers use emotional as well as physical
humiliation, particularly in front of family members. Interviewees
also report poor hygienic conditions, overcrowding, and lack of
medical services. In some cases, there are reports that patients died
by suicide due to desperation. Interviewees mention lack of trust in
the treatment system and fear that they will be put through similar
154
At the national level, from 2006 to 2012, the National Center for the
Prevention and Control of Addictions (CENADIC), through the National Census of
Establishments Specialized in the Treatment of Addictions, reported the existence
of 560 outpatient facilities and 1736 residential establishments (including anexos and
granjas, as well as private institutions), which deal with drug use. According to
recent data from CONADIC, as of April 2018, only 340 “Specialized Establishments
in the Treatment of Addictions in Residential Modality” were registered by the
government. These 340 include the forty-three public centers.
155
Other studies have much higher numbers, with public health officials
estimating that there are between 1,000–4,000 annexes in Mexico City alone.
Because most centers are not registered, the information that is available about the
annexes comes mainly from unofficial sources, such as newspapers and the radio.
See Blanca Valadez, Retiros de alcohólicos, cárceles de terror [Withdrawals of alcoholics,
prisons of terror], MILENIO, 2008, http://www.milenio.com/node/134891; Arlett
Mendoza, Dañan a adictos centros piratas [Damage to addicted pirate centers], REFORMA
2010, https://webmaster316.wordpress.com/2010/02/17/retiros-de-alcoholicoscarceles-de-terror/ [https://perma.cc/QLH4-BNN3].
156
Norma Oficial Mexicana, [Official Mexican Standard], NOM-028-SSA21999, Para la prevención, tratamiento y control de las adicciones, [For the
prevention, treatment, and control of addictions], Diario Oficial de la Federación
[DOF]
12-042000
(Mex.),
http://www.salud.gob.mx/unidades/cdi/nom/028ssa29.html
[https://perma.cc/6DE6-9J88].
157 See OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS, NI SOCORRO, NI SALUD: ABUSOS EN VEZ DE
REHABILITACIÓN PARA USUARIOS DE DROGA EN AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE, [NO
HEALTH, NO HELP: ABUSE AS DRUG REHABILITATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE
CARIBBEAN], 2016. See also Anderson et al., supra note 153.
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conditions as reasons for not seeking treatment again. Additionally,
people who work in these centers are not properly trained to
diagnose or treat the symptoms.158 Patients often relapse for lack of
proper treatment.159
Drug courts were created in Mexico as an alternative to
incarceration, alleging a shift towards a health perspective in drug
policy. In 2009, the first drug court was created in the state of Nuevo
Leon.160 By 2013, the government decided to expand the program
throughout the country. Since then, five more states—Morelos, the
State of Mexico, Chihuahua, Durango, and Chiapas—have
established drug courts, while Mexico City and Baja California are
also considering their implementation.161
Drug courts are not specialized tribunals, but rather special
procedures within ordinary criminal courts. If a person is eligible
for the program, prosecution is suspended for as long as that person
complies with it. Failure to complete the program results in the
reactivation of prosecution. This means treatment operates within
the criminal justice system, not through health service providers. As
stated by a recent report by the Social Science Research Council,
Defendants remain in criminal proceedings at every step in
the drug court program, risk incarceration both as a sanction
while in the program and for failure to complete it, and, in
some cases, spend more time behind bars than they would

158
The substance abuse that people are treated for in these centers differs from
study to study, with alcohol being consistently the most common (39.3 percent),
followed by methamphetamines (22.9 percent), marijuana (14.3 percent), cocaine
(9.4 percent), inhalants (5.5 percent) and heroin (3.4 percent). In the government’s
youth-centered institutions, Youth Integration Centers (CIJ), the two drugs most
frequently reported were marijuana (41.1 percent) and methamphetamine (16.1
percent). It is important to point out that methamphetamine does not appear as
widely-used (with less than 0.2 percent) in the national survey, yet it is a drug that
is often visible at treatment centers. See ENCODAT, supra note 137.
159
COMISIÓN ESTATAL DE DERECHOS HUMANOS DE SAN LUIS POTOSÍ [STATE
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN SAN LUIS POTOSÍ] (CEDHSLP), INFORME ESPECIAL:
SOBRE CENTROS DE TRATAMIENTO DE ADICCIONES EN MODALIDAD RESIDENCIAL,
[SPECIAL REPORT: ON ADDICTION TREATMENT CENTERS IN RESIDENTIAL MODALITY],
2011.
160
Tania T. Ramírez, Cortes de drogas en México: persiguiendo a los consumidores
[Drug Courts in Mexico: Persecuting Consumers], NEXOS (June 25, 2015),
https://eljuegodelacorte.nexos.com.mx/?p=4743 [https://perma.cc/Z2DJ-A7BR].
161
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, DRUG COURTS IN THE AMERICAS: A
REPORT BY THE DRUGS, SECURITY AND DEMOCRACY PROGRAM 50 (2018).
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have had they chosen to pursue criminal justice proceedings
instead of drug court.162
Initial data regarding the functioning of drug courts shows that
in most cases the program is used for young men accused of simple
possession of cannabis.163 The exception was the state of Nuevo
Leon where the program is used mostly to treat alcohol abuse and
family violence. Since 2016, the Mexican government took steps to
replace the original drug treatment model with the “Model of
Therapeutic Justice Program for People with Psychoactive
Substance Use”. This new model, still based on the drug court
model, seeks to standardize the criteria by which they operate.164
However, as before, it keeps all drug offences within the sphere of
the criminal justice system.
Other vulnerable populations
Drug policy based on prohibition does not affect everyone
equally. Certain groups, such as women, young men from poor
suburban areas, and farmers, have been disproportionally affected
by prohibition.
In the case of women, several studies show that, although the
majority of the incarcerated people in Latin America (including
Mexico) are men, the number of women in prisons is growing. The
majority of these women are incarcerated for drug-related crimes,165
come from poor backgrounds and, in some countries, are
predominantly black.166 Many women get involved in the drug
trade due to economic difficulties, but the penal response further

Id. at 2.
Ramírez, supra note 160.
164
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 161, at 51.
165
Wola et al., MUJERES, POLÍTICAS DE DROGAS Y ENCARCELAMIENTO, UNA GUÍA
PARA LAS REFORMAS DE POLÍTICAS EN AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE, 2016. [WOMEN,
DRUG POLICIES, AND INCARCERATION, A GUIDE TO POLICY REFORMS IN LATIN AMERICA
AND
THE
CARIBBEAN],
2016,
https://www.oas.org/es/cim/docs/womendrugsincarceration-es.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6U35-LHRN]. See also Gretchen Cloutier, Latin America’s Female
Prisoner Problem: How the War on Drugs, Feminization of Poverty, and Female Liberation
Contribute to Mass Incarceration of Women, 7(1) CLOCKS & CLOUDS (2016).
166
Jodie Michelle Lawston, Women, the Criminal Justice System, and
Incarceration: Processes of Power, Silence and Resistance, 20 FEM. FORM. (2008).
162
163
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aggravates these problems. Due to their incarceration, their
dependents are further exposed to risk and vulnerability.167
Most of the women processed and sanctioned for drug crimes
are non-violent offenders, processed for micro-trafficking or
possession of illicit substances.168 They often enter the drug trade as
low-level mules, but have little chance of upward mobility in terms
of economic earning and decision-making power.169 Furthermore,
in several Latin American countries, like Mexico, transportation of
drugs is more severely punished than other drug crimes. This
means that, when women are detained for carrying substances from
one point to another, they often receive extremely harsh
punishments.170
Studies also show that prohibition has caused thousands of
adolescents to be prosecuted and incarcerated, shattering their life
projects.171 Enforcement of current drug laws puts these young men
and women through a criminal justice system that not only
stigmatizes them for life but also impairs their right to health.172 As
described earlier, prison conditions in Mexico are precarious.
Prisoners live in overcrowded cells, lacking water, food, medicine
and general services.173 Youth centers share many of the problems
of adult prisons in the country. Through their exposure to this
system, these young men and women are exposed to violence, drug
abuse, and discrimination.
Like women, however, their
participation in the drug market is often trivial and when arrested,
they are easily replaced with other minors.174
The criminalization of these social groups often has devastating
effects on their families and communities but makes little difference
in the illegal market. The use of prison represents a burden to
families and often worsens the situation that pushed them into
entering the illegal market. As stated by the Washington Office on
CHAPARRO & PÉREZ CORREA, supra note 129, at 110.
Lawston, supra note 166.
169
Cloutier, supra note 165.
170
CHAPARRO & PÉREZ CORREA, supra note 129, at 110.
171
CHAPARRO & PÉREZ CORREA, supra note 129, at 120.
172
CHAPARRO & PÉREZ CORREA, supra note 129, at 120.
173
CHAPARRO & PÉREZ CORREA, supra note 129, at 33–34.
174
ROSE MARIE ACHÁ, JÓVENES Y ADOLESCENTES PRIVADOS DE LIBERTAD POR
DROGAS EN AMÉRICA LATINA [YOUTH DEPRIVED OF LIBERTY BY DRUGS IN LATIN
AMERICA] (Colectivo de Estudios de Drogas y Derecho, 2015),
http://www.drogasyderecho.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Rose_v07.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZHB3-KFN3].
167
168
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Latin America (WOLA) report “Women, Drug Policy and
Incarceration”, women accused of drug crimes
[ . . . ] rarely pose a threat to society. Most are arrested for
low-level yet high-risk tasks (small-scale drug dealing or
transporting drugs); they become involved as a result of
poverty, or at times due to coercion by a partner or relative.
Their incarceration contributes little if anything to
dismantling illegal drug markets or improving public
security. To the contrary, prison tends to worsen the
situation, further limiting their chances of finding decent and
legal employment when released from prison, thus
perpetuating a vicious cycle of poverty, involvement in drug
markets, and incarceration.175
Farming communities dedicated to growing poppy and
marijuana are usually located in very poor rural regions of the
country.176 They often plant illicit crops as the only means of
obtaining an income.177 Eradication of these crops is commonly
done with the use of dangerous pesticides that pollute water
sources, animals, and sometimes even legal crops, leaving
communities without food sources. These chemicals present a risk
to the health of farmers and their communities. In the case of
marijuana, the chemical Paraquat is often used in Mexico to
eradicate illicit crops.178 Paraquat is a chemical used to control grass,
however, it is highly toxic and may lead to poisoning.179 If ingested
in large amounts, it will likely lead to pain and swelling of the mouth
and throat and gastrointestinal (digestive tract) symptoms, such as
nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, and diarrhea (which may
become bloody).180 Ingestion of small to medium amounts of
Paraquat can lead to other issues such as liver failure, kidney failure,
heart failure and lung scarring.181
According to COFEPRIS (Comisión Federal para la Protección
Contra Riesgos Sanitarios), the Mexican FDA, Paraquat can remain
Wola et al., supra note 165.
Pérez Correa & Ruiz, supra note 9.
177 Pérez Correa & Ruiz, supra note 9, at 41.
178 Pérez Correa & Ruiz, supra note 9, at 37–38.
179 Paraquat,
CENTER FOR DISASTER CONTROL AND
https://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/paraquat/basics/facts.asp
[https://perma.cc/9N2Q-PQQU].
180 Id.
181 Id.
175
176
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in the ground for up to three years182, which raises serious concerns
regarding the potential risk to communities where it is used by the
government to eradicate illicit marijuana crops. In addition to
Paraquat, Glyphosate is used in Mexico to eradicate both marijuana
and poppy plantations. In Colombia, given the potential risk to the
health of farming communities, the Constitutional Court ruled
against the aerial aspersion of Glyphosate to eradicate poppy
plantations.183 In 2017, the court ordered the discontinuation of the
aerial aspersion of Glyphosate in all territories arguing that “when
a reasonable doubt exists regarding the possible damage to the
environment or to the health of people [ . . . ] all measures should be
taken to avoid any damage.”184
The logic justifying the use of these chemicals in Mexico—for the
destruction of illicit crops to protect health—highly contrasts with
the harms caused by the policy. Put together with other costs
generated by prohibition and shown above, the transformation of
drug policy in Mexico becomes a necessity.
4. GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR MEXICO’S DRUG POLICY
In this section, we outline five guiding principles that, in our
view, should inform Mexico’s drug policy. In addition, as a sixth
point, we address the constraints to domestic regulation that stem
from international treaties that govern prohibition.
Principles can better guide policy interventions when they are
formulated with clear objectives in mind. Therefore, identifying the
public problems that need to be addressed by policy is crucial.
There are two types of problems that a comprehensive and
evidence-based drug policy needs to address in Mexico: (i) problems
that have resulted from the drug policy currently in place, and (ii)
problems stem from unmanaged drug use.
182
Paraquat: datos de identificación [Paraquat: identification data], Institutio
Nacional de Ecología y Cambio Climático [National Institute of Ecology and
Climate
Change]
(INECC),
http://www2.inecc.gob.mx/sistemas/plaguicidas/pdf/paraquat.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TD5K-CNAR].
183
Corte Constitucional [Constitutional Court] [C.C.], febrero 7, 2017,
Sentencia
T-080/17
(Colomb.),
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2017/t-080-17.htm
[https://perma.cc/VQU6-USXN].
184 Id.
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In Mexico, drug policy reform should aim, first and urgently, to
address the problems that drug policy itself produces: violence,
systematic violations of human rights, population displacement and
criminalization of people who use drugs. Secondly, it should also
prevent and address harms to health stemming from problematic
drug use.
With these objectives in mind, the guiding principles that inform
the recommendations that will be offered in the last section are the
following:
a. The right to health185
Prohibition, as applied today, should be considered
unconstitutional simply because it violates the right to health.
Legislative history186 and Supreme Court precedents establish that
substance regulation is one of the ways through which the State
must protect the right to health, as determined in Article 4 of the
Constitution.187 In key tobacco control cases, the Supreme Court has
upheld substance regulation on the grounds that proper regulation,
in relation to substances potentially damaging to health, is
grounded in the right to health and a means of fulfilling state
obligations in relation to it. Moreover, the Court found that the
regulation most protective of health prevails over that which is less
protective.188 Furthermore, the Court has found that adequate
regulation of a substance—that is, regulation that is effective in
185
In the end, the negation of the right to health transits into a negation of the
right to life. We focus here on health as the broader category. Whereas the violation
of right to life is a violation of a right in itself, it can also be conceived as an extreme
in a range of affectations to the right to health. Moreover, whereas the right to life
can only be negated at an individual level, the epidemic proportions of homicides
have a secondary impact on public health, as the decrease in life expectancy in
Mexico under the war on drugs illustrates. Thus, we choose to use the right to
health as a broader category that allows us to see the public health impact of the
epidemic rise in homicides. It should be understood, however, that the extreme
affectation of health that is the loss of life can also be framed and understood, at an
individual level, as the negation of the right to life. See Madrazo & Alonso, supra
note 46.
186 See CPEUM, supra note 40, at art. 1 (referring to the 1983 constitutional
amendment introducing the health as a constitutional right).
187
CPEUM, supra note 40, at art. 4.
188
See, e.g., Acción de Inconstitucionalidad 119/2008, Pleno de la SCJN,
Novena
Época,
3
de
septiembre
de
2009
(Mex.),
www2.scjn.gob.mx/juridica/engroses/3/2008/19/3_103860_0.doc
[https://perma.cc/2AG9-CNXS] (supporting that the most protective regulation of
health prevails over that which is less protective).
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protecting health—is something that individuals can judicially
demand from the State.189 Specifically, it has found that citizens can
challenge legislation that purportedly seeks to protect human health
but in reality ends up effectively harming or risking the health of
individuals.190
Fundamental rights imply an obligation on the State to refrain
from impinging upon them (a negative obligation), but also—
according to Article 1 of the Constitution—imply further obligations
to procure a context that is conducive to the enjoyment of those rights
(positive obligations). Among the positive obligations of the State
that stem from all fundamental rights is the obligation to protect
people from impingement of that right by third parties (i.e., private
actors). Also, on occasion, there may exist an obligation of the State
to directly provide goods and services necessary for the enjoyment
of that right by the State itself.191 For instance, providing public
education or basic health services, such as vaccination campaigns,
would fall under this type of obligation. In other words, every
fundamental right may engender different types of obligation for
the State, not just the (negative) obligation of refraining from
impinging upon a fundamental right.
Since 2011, Article 1 of the Constitution explicitly recognizes
four such types of obligations: (i) to promote conditions enabling
their enjoyment; (ii) to respect, through non-interference, a person’s
enjoyment of a right; (iii) to protect from impingement on that right
by third parties; and (iv) to guarantee, in some cases, the direct
provision of goods and services needed for the exercise of that right.
The government thus has obligations to respect the right to health,
i.e., refrain from directly engaging in situations which unnecessarily
189
See, e.g., Amparo en Revisión [Petition for Constitutional Relief] 315/2010,
Pleno
de
la
SCJN,
28
de
marzo
de
2011
(Mex.),
https://www.globalhealthrights.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/08/Balderas_Woolrich_v._Mexico-Mexico-20111.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F64Q-JZ4P] (supporting that the regulation of a substance
protecting health can be judicially demanded from the State).
190
Acción de Inconstitucionalidad 119/2008, supra note 188; Amparo en
Revisión 315/2010, supra note 189.
191
See CPEUM, supra note 40, at art. 1 (“Todas las autoridades, en el ámbito
de sus competencias, tienen la obligación de promover, respetar, proteger y
garantizar los derechos humanos de conformidad con los principios de
universalidad, interdependencia, indivisibilidad y progresividad”; “All authorities,
within the scope of their powers, have the obligation to promote, respect, protect
and guarantee human rights in accordance with the principles of universality,
interdependence, indivisibility and progressivity.”). For an analysis of this article
specifically focusing on the right to health, see Madrazo & Alonso, supra note 46.
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threaten the health of the population; to protect the right to health by
keeping third parties from harming the health of individuals; to
provide key services, such as treatment for and prevention of abuse;
and to promote health, by providing a context in which people can
protect their own health effectively.
Prohibition fails to comply with all four types of obligations and
should thus be deemed unconstitutional on the grounds of the right
to health. Even if it failed to comply with only one of these
obligations, without procuring effective protection to some aspect of
health, that is tangible and documented, it should be considered
unconstitutional.
In the following lines, we flesh out how prohibition in Mexico
violates the right to health by looking at the four types of obligations
that the State has in reference to the population’s health. The
following paragraphs are illustrative and should not be understood
to be the only actual—or potential—negative impacts on (the right
to) health that prohibition has engendered.
First, Mexico, by enforcing prohibition, fails to promote the right
to health by creating a situation in which health (and life) become
far more vulnerable.
Enforcement policies in Mexico have
propagated the epidemic of homicides. A result of this epidemic, as
mentioned above, is a fall in average life expectancy in Mexico. This
means that there are good reasons to believe that prohibition
negatively affects the general health conditions of Mexicans to a
degree that it affects even the broadest indicators of health of a
population: average life expectancy. Also, Mexico’s government
fails to promote health when its prohibitionist discourse crowds out
harm reduction efforts to communicate vital information for safe
use.
Second, through its enforcement of prohibition, Mexico fails to
respect the right to health. Users are exposed to an unclear and
uncertain legal system that makes them targets of the criminal
justice system rather than being offered information or services to
take care of their health. Also, it fails in this type of obligation by
widely tolerating—or, according to some reports, promoting192—
the unnecessary use of lethal force or the use of torture by
192 See Cadena de Mando [translated in Chain of Command], PERIODISTAS DE A PIE,
http://cadenademando.org/ [https://perma.cc/DU5J-K4EB]; Ana Langner, La
orden a los militares fue abatir a los delincuentes [The order to the military was to kill the
criminals],
EL
ECONOMISTA
(July
2,
2015),
https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/politica/%20La-orden-a-los-militares-fueabatir-a-los-delincuentes-20150702-0085.html [https://perma.cc/7BCK-QCV3].
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authorities. That is, through its unchecked use of torture and lethal
force, the Mexican government fails to fulfill its obligation to respect
the right to health of the individuals who are presumed to have
committed criminal acts.
Third, under prohibition, Mexico fails to protect the health of
users from third parties who provide unsafe substances in the black
markets and unsafe treatment facilities that informally operate
throughout the country.
Finally, under prohibition and with a public treatment service
focused exclusively on abstention, Mexico fails to provide necessary
health services—specifically, treatment options—for people who
would benefit from assisted treatment and/or substitution
treatment.
For these reasons, we hold that the State is under the obligation
to provide health services—such as safe and voluntary treatment for
problematic use—as well as a regulatory framework that allows
people who use drugs to have informed and safe access to drugs
they choose to use.
The right to health also implies an obligation to refrain from
adopting policies that create serious harm to health for both people
who use drugs and the general population. We have presented, in
the previous sections of this paper, a considerable amount of
evidence that points to this problem. Prohibition enforcement has
been a key driver in the homicide epidemic, affecting the general
population—not only people the State claims were committing drug
crimes or drug users. Prohibition harms the health of people who
use drugs and who commit drug crimes and are imprisoned for
doing so. Prohibition also affects their families’ health. Many
people are harmed by prohibition, and there are no documented
benefits to the health of users, or anyone else, stemming from
prohibition.
Damages and risks related to drugs are of two types: the
primary, related to the use, and the secondary, related to the illicit
nature of the drug market. In Mexico, the secondary risks and harms
clearly outweigh the primary. The harms to health resulting from
violence significantly surpass those caused by the direct use of
illegal drugs, especially when more stringent measures are adopted
to enforce prohibition. In other words, grounding drug policy in the
right to health calls for the adoption of a robust understanding of
harm reduction, which includes not only minimizing the negative
health impact of drug use, but—more urgently—minimizing the
negative health impact of the current drug policy. The data
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summarized in this text suggests that separating a third type of
damage and risk to health related to drugs may be in order, at least
in Mexico: the risks and damages resulting directly from enforcing
prohibition.
b. The right to freely develop one’s personality
In principle, drug use is permitted by the Mexican
Constitution.193 By implication, the Mexican Constitution permits
the production of drugs. Mexico’s Supreme Court found that the
fundamental right to the free development of an individual’s
personality protects an individual’s choice to use marijuana. 194
Accordingly, it has found that a blanket ban—as exists today—on
actions such as possession, cultivation, and access to this substance
is incompatible with Mexico’s Constitution. The protection of such
an individual choice—with all its implications regarding safe access
to drugs—must, therefore, be a core principle guiding drug policy.
As regulation substitutes for prohibition, safe access to drugs and
the conditions to make an informed choice regarding use must be
factored into policy design.
c. Policies tailored to and by local communities
Prohibition is the wrong approach to drug policy, because it is a
one-size-fits-all solution to a phenomenon that is both complex and
highly context-dependent. Regulation should leave room for the
tailoring of interventions to the needs of each community, but also
and importantly, for community involvement in defining those
needs and interventions.195 Much of the violence documented
throughout Mexico relates to the undermining of local governments’

193
The Court opinions speak exclusively to cannabis, but arguably the
substantive arguments that constitute their ratio hold equally for other substances.
While the Constitution may admit more restrictive specific policy designs for other
drugs, the core finding—that an absolute ban on use overreaches margins of
legislative regulatory powers—in principle holds for all drugs.
194
Amparo indirecto 237/2014, supra note 79; Amparo Indirecto 637/2017,
supra note 84; Amparo Indirecto 1163/2017, supra note 84; Amparo Indirecto
1115/2017, supra note 84.
195
This of course, should always be within a human rights framework and the
protection of personal freedom.
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institutional capacities.196 Restoring community trust and social
reparations to populations affected by the violence stemming from
prohibition must be the focus of locally tailored interventions.
d. Effective access to information, medication and treatment
Making evidence-based information available regarding the
risks and dangers of drug use is one of the State’s obligations in
protecting the right to health. As to treatment, the State has the
obligation to offer prevention and rehabilitation services. These
services should be voluntary, free, secular, and universally
accessible based on health and human rights. Any model that is
used to comply with this obligation must be tailored to reduce risks
and harms.
e. Diversification and evidence-based revision of the laws
Prohibition has inhibited the exploration of less harmful and
more effective policies. A swift shift away from violently enforced
prohibition and militarization should include strict independent
monitoring and evaluation of results of new different interventions.
Systematic monitoring and evaluation of results must be essential
components of a drug policy comprising regulation.
f.

Respect for human rights and a note on international law

Much has been written regarding the weight of constraints to
domestic regulation that stem from international treaties that govern
prohibition. The debate is ample and complex, but the basic
positions on the matter are clearly and succinctly set forth in the
Global Commission’s 2018 Report on Regulation: The Responsible
Control of Drugs.197
We affirm, confidently, that regulation is a constitutional
obligation in Mexico notwithstanding the country’s condition as
signatory of the prohibitionist UN Conventions.
Mexico’s drug policy must be grounded, first and foremost, on
human rights. As explained above, Mexico has a peculiar position
196 See, e.g., Meza, supra note 52; Escalante, supra note 92; and Catalina Pérez
Correa & Carlos De la Rosa, (In)Security and Self-Government: Lessons from the
Mexican Experience, ICL J. (forthcoming).
197 Regulation: The Responsible Control of Drugs, supra note 13.
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in this respect, for its Supreme Court has repeatedly held that drug
use falls within the constitutional protection of the right to freely
develop one’s personality. Moreover, Mexico’s generous right to
health doctrine provides solid grounding for harm reducing
regulatory models regarding drugs. Because of this, it makes sense
to ponder the weight of the international drug regulation regime in
light of the international human rights regime, for the latter is
inextricably tied to Mexico’s robust human rights domestic law.
Reputable legal scholars have put forward a clear and compelling
case that according to “a systematic and comprehensive
interpretation of international law, the human rights system has
legal primacy over the international drug control regime.”198
These authors recognize that international human rights law and
international drug policy regulation have evolved independently
and, consequently, come into tension as the international drug
policy regime directly and indirectly violates human rights.
Directly, for instance, because prohibition implies measures such as
denying access to essential medicines, establishing disproportionate
punishments, or disregarding traditional uses of coca for minority
cultures.
Indirectly, because empirical evidence shows that
prohibition enforcement exacerbates phenomena such as violence,
human rights violations, displacements, disappearances, and
torture. Undoubtedly, as we lay out in this paper, this is the case for
Mexico.
When the two international law systems clash, international
human rights law should prevail. The UN’s human rights norms
prevail over drug conventions, for the former derive directly from
the UN Charter itself, whereas international obligations regarding
drug prohibition are “not an expression of the state obligations
under the charter.”199 Moreover, one of the fundamental purposes
of the UN is the promotion and protection of human rights; this is
not so for drug prohibition. Furthermore, many of the human rights
norms are considered jus cogens (the highest level in the hierarchy of
norms in international law); in fact, they correctly point out, most
jus cogens norms are human rights norms. Finally, the General
Assembly of the United Nations has declared that the international

198
Rodrigo Uprimny & Diana Esther Guzmán, Drug Policies and Human Rights
(forthcoming) (on file with authors).
199 Id.
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drug regulation regime must respect the UN Charter in general and
human rights in particular.200
As this paper shows, prohibition in Mexico has led to the gravest
human rights crisis in decades, while drug regulation as here
proposed is grounded in domestically and internationally
recognized human rights. The choice, we believe, is clear.
Regulation is a constitutional obligation.
5. FROM PROHIBITION TO REGULATION
This section sets out concrete regulatory and policy proposals for
the most important drug markets that are currently illegal. We draw
from international experiences, but offer regulatory models and
policies tailored to Mexico’s specific needs, weaknesses, and
strengths. Admittedly, the proposals are not fully developed here,
but simply sketched. Although prevention, information, and
treatment for those who need it are not mentioned in every
regulatory proposal, we consider them an essential part of any
model.
We begin by presenting two measures that we believe should be
adopted immediately, regardless of how far and how quickly
Mexico’s government is willing and capable to move towards
regulation of all substances. A third section contains concrete
proposals for regulating access to some drugs, with each substance
discussed separately.
Release of non-violent prisoners
Draconian prohibition has frequently entailed the
criminalization of people who use drugs, and, therefore, has had a
discriminatory and disparate impact on the poorest participants in
today’s illegal market. This is, for example, the case for most women
and farmers detained for drug crimes. Because of this, an aggressive
program of case revisions in which non-violent drug offenders can
obtain their release from prison should be put in place

200

2007).

See G.A. Res. 63/197, ¶ 1 (Dec. 18, 2008); G.A. Res. 62/176, ¶ 1 (Dec. 18,
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immediately.201
There are several legal modalities for the
implementation of such a program, ranging from early release to
amnesty. Whatever the choice of legal vehicle, what is most
important is to rapidly alleviate one of the most harmful and
continuing burdens that prohibition has placed on users and
vulnerable communities: imprisonment.
People who have been convicted for use or simple possession of
any illegal drug should have their cases revised with the objective of
securing their release and/or their sentences revoked. Additionally,
the government must implement measures that allow for a
successful social and labor reintegration of those prisoners who
benefit from the early release, pardon or amnesty. The following
measures are recommended:
Eliminate criminal records for those crimes and restore all
active rights.
Design programs specifically tailored to help released drug
prisoners in their reintegration into society. Education and
training consistent with their capabilities and compatible
with the needs of the labor-market should be an essential
part of those programs.
Provide incentives and other stimuli through which the
populations disproportionately affected by prohibition can
participate in the opportunities stemming from the emerging
legal drug industries. For instance, lowly farmers in regions
where chemical eradication of crops has taken place and
caused most harm should be given priority if they wish to
become legal producers.
Implement non-discrimination measures to de-stigmatize
drug users who have long been targeted by government
campaigns in the context of prohibition.
Provide counseling, medical attention and voluntary
treatment to those who require it.
Additionally, Congress should revise the proportionality of all
existing penalties for “crimes against health”, especially prison
sentences. In particular, the penalties for the crime of transporting
drugs, which, as applied, disproportionately criminalizes women,
should be revised.202 Alternative sanctions—excluding compulsory
201
This proposal should not be confused with the proposal for amnesty in
Mexico, which is circumscribed in the idea of transitional justice.
202
Many women who are persecuted for crimes against health are detained
because of drug transportation. They are generally not dangerous to society and
having them in prison presents high social costs, many times much greater than the
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treatment—should be favored for non-violent crimes related to
drugs.
Decriminalization of use of all drugs
Decriminalization of the use and possession for personal use of
all illegal substances is recommended, including the
decriminalization203 of possession of amounts needed for personal
use, which are currently unrealistically low.
Importantly,
thresholds should be based on user´s practices, and defined as a
floor below which possession cannot be persecuted and above
which intent to sell or distribute needs be proven in order to
persecute.204 Prosecutors and judges should prove intent for illegal
commerce in the case of possession and not simply punish
individuals on charges of simple possession.
Legal and regulated access to specific drugs
Considering the harms resulting from the existing drug policy,
we unequivocally recommend moving towards the establishment of
legal and well-regulated systems that allow people who use drugs
to access them in a safe and informed manner, beginning with
cannabis but also moving promptly to regulate the supply of other
currently illegal drugs. Although prudence may suggest gradual,
tiered changes in policy, we believe that regulating only one drug
and leaving the people who use others in the hands of criminals and
costs of the crime for which they are being accused. The Federal Criminal Code
currently establishes that penalties for the transport of drugs range from ten to 25
years in prison. This Federal Criminal Code also establishes that alternative
measures can only be applied for crimes that do not surpass a penalty of four years
of prison. This means that most women are automatically taken out of the pool of
people that can receive alternative measures. Therefore, thinking about alternative
measures must be done at the same time as a review of penalties. See Rodrigo
Meneses & Catalina Pérez Correa, Mujeres y drogas: Cómo sentencian los jueces
federales a hombres y mujeres acusados de delitos contra la salud, in CATALINA PÉREZ
CORREA, ET AL., DE LA DETENCIÓN A LA PRISIÓN: LA JUSTICIA PENAL A EXAMEN, (CIDE,
2015).
203
Currently, possessing drugs within the tolerated amounts is not penalized
but remains a crime.
204
Currently, thresholds function as a roof, above which possession is always
persecuted.
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the criminal justice system, means accepting unjustifiable social
harms. As argued before, only decriminalizing use and simple
possession of drugs leaves us in a predicament close to the current
crisis: both black markets and violent prohibition would continue to
exist. To avoid this, we propose a policy aiming to regulate the
supply of all drugs.
Importantly, the substance-specific policies set forth should be
understood under the same logic identified as “the essence of the
case for regulation” in the Global Commission’s 2018 Regulation
report.205 There, the Global Commission subscribes the idea that full
prohibition and a fully free market are functional equivalents: both
represent a substantially unregulated market, maximizing the
potential risks and harms that derive from the operation of any
market trading in psychoactive substances.206
Graph 3: Different Drugs Different Degrees of Regulation207

Regulation: The Responsible Control of Drugs, supra note 13, at 12.
Id.
207 See Regulation: The Responsible Control of Drugs, supra note 13, supra note 13,
figure 1 at 12.
205
206
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If the extremes of the curve in the regulatory model in Graph 3
are functionally equivalent, and minimal risks and harms are to be
found at the lowest point in the curve, then the relevant question is
which type of regulation brings us to that lowest point.
Unavoidably, the answer is both context and substance specific.
Different communities may reach the lowest point in the curve with
different regulatory models; the same is true for every substance.
There is no one-size-fits all solution. Furthermore, we cannot be
sure how a specific regulation will play out in a given community
until it is actually in place and properly measured. Accordingly,
regulatory models should be brought under revision periodically,
provided that there is good information and a rigorous
methodology to make a reliable assessment.
The proposed regulation models, therefore, should be
understood as entry points into regulation and away from
prohibition, and they should be always susceptible to revision.
Because prohibition has been the rule and not the exception for a
long time, there is a scarcity of experiences to draw from. Some
substances—such as cannabis—offer a broader spectrum of
previous and ongoing experiences than others—such as cocaine.
Accordingly, for the case of cannabis, we lay out more than one
possible entry point into regulation. In other cases, such as cocaine,
we offer one possible entry point which we believe could guide the
experimentation of policy in the case of Mexico. All proposals here
contained are compatible with and informed by the general
recommendations for regulation set forth by the Global Commission
2018 Report on Regulation.
1. Cannabis
The first substance that should be regulated is cannabis. The
Supreme Court, following legal procedure, has notified Congress
that a blanket prohibition on cannabis has been repeatedly held to
be unconstitutional.208 Regulating access to cannabis is not only a
policy imperative but required by the Constitution and therefore
necessary in order to abide by the rule of law.
There are different models that can be used for regulating
cannabis, ranging from the alcohol-style commercial model,
208
Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, Declaratoria de
Inconstitucionalidad
1/2018,
http://www2.scjn.gob.mx/denunciasincumplimiento/ConsultaGenerales.aspx
[https://perma.cc/U9NP-8744].
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currently in place in some US states such as Colorado and
Washington, to a state monopoly, as in Uruguay. We explore three
different models in this section and try to identify their relative
strengths and weaknesses. Irrespective of the model chosen, public
health should be accorded the highest priority by the government.
Regulation should therefore seek to:
Reduce harms caused by the illicit market (harms such as
violence and proliferation of organized crime);
Reduce harms to individual health from heavy/problematic
use;
Reduce youth use;
Prevent harms from contaminants and additives, and
provide for quality assurance and consumer information;
Reduce harms to others from harmful use of cannabis
(impairment/intoxication, exposure to second-hand smoke);
Minimize the risk of corporate—or any other special
interest—capture of regulation; and
Make efforts to include in the new legal markets those
communities and populations most affected under
prohibition, such as growers, dealers from the poorest
communities, and internally displaced communities.
Additionally,
the
following
measures—drawn
from
international legal standards for substance regulation—should be
adopted, independently of the model chosen:
(i) Packaging and labeling: use childproof packaging, clear and
explicit health warnings, content labeling (potency and
ingredients), and plain packaging.
(ii) Advertising, promotion and sponsorship: prohibit all
publicity, promotion, and sponsorship of cannabis products.
This is in line with the international best practices in tobacco
control.
(iii) Taxes: establish a tax system that keeps the price sufficiently
low so that consumers do not return to the black market, but
high enough to discourage use at the margin. Taxes and
other fiscal revenues from this activity should be, at least
partially, earmarked for three areas: a) prevention and
treatment programs especially targeted at youth prevention;
b) economic development, education, and job placement for
communities most affected by prohibition; and c) medical
cannabis research. We propose earmarking for reasons of
political economy, although we concur that it is not an
impeccably sound fiscal practice.
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(iv) Regulate modalities of use: implement tobacco control
efforts, such as the establishment of smoke-free zones.
Employ alcohol control measures, such as a ban on driving
under the influence.
(v) Product regulation: regulate the type of products (edibles,
lotions, concentrates), permitted ingredients (prohibit any
product mixed with nicotine or other, more addictive
substances, for example), and potency levels.
(vi) Regulate the distribution and sale: this includes the number
and type of stores, locations where they can be established,
restrictions of on-site use, minimum age for purchase, limits
on sales and who can sell or grow for commercial purposes.
The first five elements should be similar in any model.
Differences between models should lie mainly in the structure of the
industry: the regulation of production, distribution, and access so as
to determine who can participate in the cultivation, production, and
sale of cannabis, and how.
Independently of the model chosen, regulation should always
allow for two modalities of production and access: (I) Domestic
cultivation for personal use of a limited number of plants per
household at any time. (II) Cannabis clubs, conceived as non-profit
civil associations, constituted with the purpose of guaranteeing for
members the monthly supply of a determined amount of cannabis.
It is an associative self-provisioning mechanism produced
exclusively for its members, who pay a fixed fee to produce their
cannabis in a regulated manner, with standards set by a specialized
public body.
These two modalities, by themselves, would not be sufficient to
satisfy the existing demand, as most users are occasional and may
decide not to participate in them. Therefore, it is necessary to allow
for the formation of a cannabis industry to supply most (occasional)
users. With this in mind, we sketch three possible models for
establishing a legal cannabis industry. They should be seen as three
cases within a continuous range of possibilities. The three models
offered here can also be seen as stages of a path through which
regulation can transit. Direction of transit, however, is not
irrelevant: if the initial model is commercial, it will be difficult to
move it to a more state-controlled model even if the experiment
suggests the latter approach as the best. Vested interests will
quickly become entrenched as a private industry is set up. The other
direction—from government control to commercial orientation—in
principle would pose a lesser problem of entrenched vested interests
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resisting the evolution of the model. Yet it should be kept in mind
that in Mexico, in the past resistance to transform state owned
enterprises has been strongest from government insiders.
a. A commercially oriented model
Under this system, cultivation, production, distribution, and sale
would be in the hands of the private market, subject of course to the
pertinent laws and regulations, which should be enforced by a
specialized government institution properly empowered—legally
and financially. The main advantage of this model would be to offer
an array of products and prices that better satisfy demand at little
cost to the State. The main disadvantage of this model, specifically
in the case of Mexico, is the potential creation of an industry whose
primary concern is profit maximization, not public health. Mexico
has a history of substance regulation being obstructed or trumped
by industry lobbying and should heed the warnings of past
experiences.209 In choosing this model, strict limits on vertical
integration are crucial. Regulation should aim to keep the industry
fragmented and compliant with very strict competition rules, so as
to minimize the risk of capture of the regulator, as has happened
before in Mexico with substances such as tobacco.
Conceivably, this model is the least likely to be conducive to
integrating vulnerable communities disproportionately affected by
the war on drugs into the new legal markets. Often marginalized
and criminalized participants in today’s current illicit market, and
the communities they come from, would probably not have the
capacity to compete in a free market by themselves, at least initially.
It is important to actively incorporate these vulnerable communities
into the new legal market, so as to draw them away from the
(smaller) illegal market that may subsist during transition from
prohibition to regulation.
b. Government monopoly
A second possibility is a state monopoly. Like in Uruguay, the
government would be responsible for every step of the production
209 See Ángela Guerrero et al., Identificación de las estrategias de la industria
tabacalera en México [Identification of the strategies of the tobacco industry in Mexico]
(Legal Studies Department (DEJ) CIDE, Working Paper No. 51, 2010),
http://www.libreriacide.com/librospdf/DTEJ-51.pdf [https://perma.cc/9U6PUCSV].
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chain, from seed to sale. Under this model, the government could
franchise producers to cultivate the drug, and then sell it through
licensed pharmacies. Still, there should be a separate and
specialized government agency in charge of regulating the entire
activity even if the latter is in the hands of the government itself.
There are several arguments in favor of a government-run
industry. It could minimize diversion of drugs to the black market
by giving the government close control over the product. By
removing profit-seeking from the core of the industry, the model
allows the government’s commitment to public health to be
paramount. Practices which are used to promote sales, such as
advertising, attractive packaging, and equivocal labeling, would be
more easily avoided, and quality control could focus on health
objectives rather than profit-maximization. Importantly, a public,
non-commercial model avoids one of the most problematic features
of current legal drug industries like tobacco: the emergence of a few
large private actors with the capacity and incentives to capture the
regulator.
A disadvantage of a government monopoly could be inefficiency
and difficulty in adapting to shifts in demand. If there is not enough
production, or the product is not of good quality or high enough
potency, some users could return to the black market. Government
monopolies are often inefficient.
c. Mixed model
This mixed model seeks to harness the benefits of the two
previous models by establishing a government monopoly
exclusively on wholesale while allowing for private production and
retail distribution through franchises. Retail sale at point-ofproduction could be permitted for producers, but the bulk of the
market would be served while avoiding vertical integration. This
model would allow for close government control of the substance
itself and simultaneously facilitate the gathering of information
about the market so as to document and assess success in achieving
the public-health goals of regulation.
Two government entities would need to be established, at least
initially: a public enterprise that would hold the monopoly over
wholesale; and as in the previous cases, a separate regulatory
agency. This bifurcation would also allow for later break-up and
privatization of the wholesale monopoly once the regulating agency
is deemed robust enough to enforce regulation without risk of
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capture. The regulating agency would license growers and approve
franchise of retail points. The public enterprise would buy the bulk
of the production (excepting point-of-sale retail), test for quality
control, package and label it and sell it to the licensed retailers. The
regulating agency would, among its other regulatory powers,
establish limits for how much can be grown for each licensed grower
or sold by retailers, and would enforce regulation such as limits on
advertising linked to cannabis and sale to minors. Through both the
state-owned distribution company and the government regulatory
agency, the state would maintain control and ensure that public
health is the priority at each link in the production chain, while
allowing for private participation in production and sale. This is
important for a country like Mexico that, unlike Uruguay, has a
considerable number of citizens currently participating in illegal
production and retail. If incorporation of this population into the
legal economy is one of the driving objectives of regulation—and it
should be—then this model has a considerable advantage over a
state monopoly.
The mixed model has all the benefits of a state monopoly, and
additional ones:
By eliminating the profit-maximizing thrust of private
intermediaries, the licit cannabis industry could quickly
become competitive and displace the illicit market.
As all products must flow through one (public) entity, the
cost of government inspection and monitoring could be
considerably lower than in a purely commercial model. A
commercial model would purportedly require inspecting
and monitoring a multiplicity of private actors. This is
particularly relevant for Mexico, as it does not currently have
the institutional capacity to effectively monitor and inspect
an open market with a large number of outlets, as tobacco
control efforts have shown in the past.
Information gathering will be significantly eased through
wholesale control. This capacity will be crucial in the initial
phases of setting up a regulated market. Periodic revisions
and adjustments of regulation will be crucial to ensure
success of a transition away from prohibition.
For the specific case of Mexico, which has a much larger
industry (production) and market (distribution) than
Uruguay but relatively weaker regulatory institutions, than,
for instance, Colorado or Canada, the mixed model allows
for simultaneously maintaining control of information and
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the market, while allowing the overwhelming majority of
non-violent private individuals, who currently participate in
the illicit industry, to move into a licit market.
Communities currently most affected by prohibition—such as
farmers and dealers from the poorest areas and those who have been
internally displaced—should be the focus of targeted programs to
ensure their incorporation into the newly established legal markets
as a form of social reparation, no matter what model is chosen. The
mixed model could be most beneficial to these groups. By allowing
the government to work as the middle-man, it would be easier and
probably less costly to have those from poorer communities
participate in the market and also ensure a safer product.
Farmers who are already growing cannabis should have the
option to continue with the cultivation of such crops. This would
have two advantages: 1) it is an incentive to exit the illicit market,
thus increasing the potential of the regulated market to displace the
former; and 2) it provides producers already specialized in the
production and distribution of marijuana, which would facilitate the
rapid construction of a legal market (and consequent displacement
of an illegal market). Those convicted only of non-violent crimes
against health and those who have not been convicted for selling to
minors should still be able to participate in the market.
2. Opioids
Opioids should also be brought into a legal market, but under
much stronger regulation than cannabis. We recommend two
parallel regulations, which are non-exclusive: (i) regulated poppy
cultivation and private production of pharmaceuticals for medical
use—both national and international—and (ii) a public monopoly
for poppy cultivation and the production and distribution of opioids
destined for uses other than pharmaceutical. Regulating poppy
cultivation and production of opioids would allow current growers
and producers to exit the illicit market and to take advantage of an
already specialized sector. This could facilitate the construction of a
legal market (and the displacement of the current illicit one).
Mexico does not have an opioid use problem like in other
countries, such as the neighboring United States. It is however, one
of the world’s main poppy cultivators. According to the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Mexico is the thirdlargest opium poppy cultivator in the world, after Afghanistan and
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Myanmar.210 By 2016, Mexican poppy cultivation had purportedly
grown more than three times the national amount estimated in
2013.211
The central objective of drug policy should be to prevent or limit
the use of opioids for non-medical purposes, while bringing
cultivators into the legal market. This can be done through
regulation. As shown by the Global Commission on Drug Policy’s
Position Paper “The Opioid Crisis in North America”,212 the opioid
epidemic in the U.S. started with poorly regulated medical
prescription and by allowing overly permissive publicity and
promotion of opioid medications. The problem was exacerbated
when a crackdown on the medical supply was carried out without
providing adequate treatment and harm reduction measures to
existing users. By abruptly cutting off legal supply, users moved
into the black market to more dangerous illicit street drugs, such as
heroin, and highly potent synthetic opioids, such as fentanyl. The
result was an increase in overdoses and mortality.213 To ensure that
Mexico does not face a similar problem, a two-pronged approach
should be implemented. On the one hand, strict controls must be
placed on the distribution, promotion, and publicity of opioidderived medicines. This should include guidelines and training on
prescription and regular monitoring of health providers.
Additionally, public health campaigns should be put in place to
warn the medical community (doctors, nurses, and hospital staff)
and patients of the risks of drug use disorder and overdoses that can
arise from the medical use of opioids. On the other hand, existing
users and people who lose access to prescription opioids should be

210 See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, WORLD DRUG REPORT
26
(2016),
https://www.unodc.org/doc/wdr2016/WORLD_DRUG_REPORT_2016_web.pd
f [https://perma.cc/BZ3P-JXHA].
211 Id.
212 See The Opioid Crisis In North America (Global Commission on Drug Policy,
Position Paper, Oct. 2017), http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/09/2017-GCDP-Position-Paper-Opioid-Crisis-ENG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4N9L-49CS]. See also Nick Werle & Ernesto Zedillo, We Can’t
Go Cold Turkey: Why Suppressing Drug Markets Endangers Society, 46 J. L. MED. &
ETHICS 325 (2018).
213 See Werle & Zedillo, supra note 212 (noting that the U.S. regulation of
opioids simultaneously suppresses and promotes their use, and the law employs
harsh criminal and regulatory sanctions to suppress illicit use, while at the same
time legally supplying opioids through an immensely profitable and powerful
pharmaceutical industry).
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offered immediate access to adequate treatment and harm reduction
measures.
Although Mexico does not yet have a problem with prescription
opiate use, it has registered a rise in heroin use.214 For the existing
heroin-using population, we propose public treatment services that
should offer a range of options including provision of heroinassisted treatment (HAT) in affected communities. If needed,
registered dependent users would be able to obtain a strictly
controlled, quality supply of heroin from doctors or pharmacists.
People who use heroin would have medical settings in which to use,
with the possibility of taking small quantities for external use. This
ensures the strength and purity of heroin is known and controlled,
and that it is used with clean injecting equipment. Pilot programs
for HAT should be set up in those places that currently have the
most prevalence, such as Tijuana and other border cities.215
Additionally, in terms of treatment, opioid substitution therapy
(OST) should be explored, including the use of medical cannabis as
a substitute for problematic opioid use.
OSTs—including
216
methadone and buprenorphine—should be put in place without
burdensome rules or drug testing requirements.217 While OSTs are
not a cure, per se, they can help patients stabilize their lives and
manage their use, and reduce the harmful consequences of
problematic drug use. Maintenance therapy has been shown to be
more clinically effective and cost effective than detoxification.218

See Martínez, supra note 141; Zambrano & Gómez, supra note 141.
In other countries currently using HAT, availability is limited. It is only
available under strict criteria, including long-term use and failure to respond to
other treatments. We recommend providing HAT without those barriers to entry.
216
Methadone is a synthetic opioid that produces longer-lasting, less intense
intoxication than heroin, permitting people with opioid dependence to achieve a
stable, high-functioning state without withdrawal symptoms or cravings. It has
been proven to reduce illicit opioid use.
217
In countries like the United States, there are extensive federal regulations
governing methadone maintenance.
Under federal law, all methadone
maintenance treatments must occur in a federally regulated opioid treatment
program. Specially licensed practitioners must provide the treatments, and the law
prohibits them from prescribing methadone. Methadone for maintenance generally
must be dispensed and immediately consumed, requiring patients to visit clinics
daily. Finally, opioid treatment programs must randomly screen patients for illicit
drugs. Other forms of opioid maintenance are also restricted by law. Doctors
seeking to prescribe buprenorphine must receive special training and certifications,
and federal law limits the number of patients they may treat at any time.
218
See Werle & Zedillo, supra note 212.
214
215

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

170

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 41:1

For opiates, we also recommend the following harm reduction
measures:219
Providing safe-injection facilities, which provide people who
use drugs with a safe, hygienic place to consume drugs
obtained off-premises;
Ensuring patients are not summarily cut off from opioids;
Implementing needle and syringe exchange programs,
including access to clean syringes, other sterile drug
equipment and education (e.g. teaching sterilization
techniques);
Providing HIV and Hepatitis C testing;
Preventing overdose, which should include prescribing
naloxone with opioids; and
Counseling and educating the community.
Finally, apart from an increase in federal, state, and local budgets
for prevention, education, and treatment, we recommend that
public funding go to the Ministry of Health to create more public
centers for residential treatment, so that people who use drugs are
not left with poorly regulated, privately run “annexes” as their only
option.220
3. Cocaine
In contrast to other substances, we offer here only one
recommendation merely as an illustration of a possible regulation
model. As in the other cases, any decision on cocaine regulation
must be based on sound, multidisciplinary and comprehensive
studies not yet available. It is important to note that what little
experience with regulation of legal coca exists is not applicable to
Mexico, as Mexico is not currently a producer of coca and has no
documented traditional use of coca.
For coca and, more
importantly, cocaine, a state monopoly of cultivation, production,
importation, and wholesale should be set up, and a limited number
of pharmacies should be licensed to sell the final product with
219
These recommended measures also apply to people who use other
injection drugs, such as meth. These policies and services should be easy to access,
involve people who use drugs in the program design, and include those people as
peers and providers. Additional providers should be trained in drug user health,
ensuring that anybody working on harm reduction measures or treatment has the
proper training and scientific and medical knowledge.
220
Like the harm reduction measures, this applies to people who use any drug
where residential treatment is needed.
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required doctor prescriptions. These pharmacies should follow strict
guidelines such as labeling and registering quantities, and not
publicizing that they sell the drug. Regulating cocaine would serve
as a harm reduction measure avoiding other, more dangerous,
forms of coca derivatives, such as crack, while providing access to
safe products. It would also be a means to reduce violence and
trafficking, specifically international trafficking as national
production would substitute for importation.
4. Others
Methamphetamine and commercial inhalants are two
substances particularly problematic under current prohibition, yet
regulated policy solutions are less frequently explored in the
literature than in the cases of opioids or cannabis. Consideration
could be given to a two-pronged approach: decriminalizing
methamphetamine use and possession for personal use and
prompting people who use methamphetamine to switch over to
safer, legal drugs. Later, the HAT model could potentially be
adapted for methamphetamine use. Currently, there are no marketapproved medications used to treat meth dependence; however,
some studies show that using prescription stimulants could treat
both methamphetamine and cocaine dependence.221 Research
should be funded to further investigate this alternative.
As to inhalants (a commercial product not currently under
prohibition yet very harmful when used as a drug), pilot programs
could be explored, such as a program to substitute an inhalant with
legal cannabis. Revenue from the emergent licit markets in
cannabis, opioids, and cocaine should be partially earmarked to
provide prevention and treatment for populations who use
inhalants, particularly youth.
Enforcement of drug laws: quickly deescalating militarization
The enforcement of drug laws should be primarily an
administrative matter, not a criminal one. The military should not
221 See John Mariani & Frances Levin, Psychostimulant Treatment of Cocaine
Dependence, 35(2) PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF NORTH AMERICA (June 2012) 425; Alison
Knopf, AMAT for methamphetamine or cocaine addiction: The case for Rx -stimulants,
27(36) ALCOHOL & DRUG ABUSE WEEKLY (Sept. 21, 2015).
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participate in drug control efforts or any other criminal or public
security matters, in accordance with Article 21 of Mexico’s
Constitution. Current militarization must be deescalated in a
programmed manner, which takes into consideration the
differentiated security needs of regions and cities and sets out timeframes needed to professionalize civil authorities that would
substitute the military forces currently tasked with public security
duties.
While the military continues to perform tasks
constitutionally reserved to civil authorities, it should be regulated
by a transitory and exceptional public security framework, which
would include guidelines for the use of weapons and protocols as
regards their presence and operations among the civilian
population. The currently used framework designed for military
conflict, to which the military’s training and tactics logically
correspond, should not be used.
It is also indispensable that government gather, produce, and
publish information about the use of force by public authorities.
Investigations should be carried out to determine responsibility in
the systematic rise of violence and torture, with civilian supervision
to ensure transparency. Importantly, every recorded case in which
authorities have used lethal force should be fully investigated by
civil—as opposed to military—authorities.
Other considerations
Given the importance of the right to health—and the obligation
of the government to respect, protect, promote, and guarantee it—
any drug policy reform should have the health system—both public
and private—as a key player. The public health system, including
the Ministry of Health and the social security institutes for private
and state workers (IMSS and ISSSTE national and state’s), should
decisively and directly participate in education, prevention and
treatment efforts, alongside the more traditional drug policy offices,
such as the National Commission Against Addictions (CONADIC).
Drug policy and the right to health in relation to drug policy are not
simply about drug use, but also about health and wellbeing in a
broader sense. Additionally, because drug policy in Mexico is tied
to many other arenas, including opportunities for employment and
education, the health sector should lead the inter-sectorial work,
with the education, agriculture, and labor sectors, to guarantee the
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right to health. The private health system should follow any new
recommendations for drug treatment as well.
In order for the government to guarantee the right to health, it
needs to improve efforts geared toward treatment, prevention, and
education. For this to take place, it is crucial to increase the federal
and state budgets, to allocate more resources.
Education and prevention:
Education and prevention should be at the center of drug
policy. This includes providing information about risks and
adopting policies to manage risk. For example, the quality
of products must be supervised, advertisement of drugs
should be tightly restricted or even banned, and sales to
minors should be punished.
The public needs to see drug use as a public health issue, not
a criminal one.
The government should promote a
destigmatizing campaign so that people who use drugs are
not criminalized or shunned.
Any strategy of prevention and education must start from
childhood to prevent the use of drugs by children. A broad
set of prevention measures need to be adopted specifically
for minors, including but not limited to services aimed at
preventing use by minors in general and early detection
programs to identify populations already engaged in
experimental or occasional use in order to help them avoid
excessive, frequent or problematic use.
Respecting the framework of human rights and, specifically,
the right to the free development of personality, an
ambitious campaign of objective and truthful information
about marijuana and its risks should be put in place so that
adults can make their personal choices.
Actions tailored to vulnerable groups, including children,
adolescents, people suffering from mental illness, and
problematic or dependent users should be designed and
implemented.
Treatment:
The State has the obligation to offer prevention and
rehabilitation services. Any model that is used to comply
with this obligation must be based on the reduction of risks
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and damages, understanding this concept as a set of policies
and non-coercive incremental programs aimed at avoiding
or reducing risk situations with a clear view to reduce the
associated damages. It must also guarantee that all the
institutions and people in charge of working in the
prevention and treatment of the problematic use of
substances are trained and sensitized with the most up-todate information.
These services should be voluntary, free, secular, and
universally accessible based on health and human rights.
It is crucial to provide resources to the Ministry of Health to
enable it to offer in-patient rehabilitation at public centers.
So that the so-called annexes will not be the only costeffective solution, the State needs to provide rehabilitation
centers where patients can stay long-term and receive
appropriate medical treatment. Budgets also need to be
increased so that monitoring and inspection of all existing
centers and annexes can take place.
There must be rehabilitation centers specifically tailored for
women.
Information:
Strengthen data collecting capabilities on the use of
marijuana in particular, and all other drugs in general.
Strengthen data collecting capabilities regarding black
markets of drugs.
Procure information on the changes in drug policy so that
variables can be identified and measured over time. This will
ensure an accurate evaluation of the success or failure of the
policy.
6. CONCLUSION
The “war on drugs” has failed globally and has led to a national
tragedy in Mexico. The attempt to enforce prohibition has brought
about crime, violence, death, disease, corruption, undermining of
institutions and violation of essential human rights. Indeed,
Mexico’s extremely weak rule of law is a big problem of which the
explosion of organized crime is one of its many expressions.
Strengthening the rule of law is possible by undertaking a
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comprehensive and intelligently conceived overhaul of the justice
and security institutions according to internationally established
and tested standards. But addressing the severe ills stemming from
the illegal trafficking of drugs requires the total abandonment of the
paradigm of prohibition that has guided drug policies for too long
in Mexico and practically everywhere else in the world. Human
rights and public health must be the two essential pillars of the new
paradigm. Prohibition must be discarded and replaced by
regulation. We have sought, in this paper, to give many reasons for
why a radical transformation of drug policy in Mexico is not only
justified but indispensable. We have also outlined possible avenues
for pursuing reform. It is crucial that this transformation be
undertaken as soon as possible.
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